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ADMINISTRATIVE SABOTAGE
David L. Noll*
Government can sabotage itself. From the president’s choice of agency heads
to agency budgets, regulations, and litigating positions, presidents and their
appointees have undermined the very programs they administer. But why
would an agency try to put itself out of business? And how can agencies that
are subject to an array of political and legal checks sabotage statutory programs?
This Article offers an account of the “what, why, and how” of administrative
sabotage that answers those questions. It contends that sabotage reflects a distinct mode of agency action that is more permanent, more destructive, and
more democratically illegitimate than more-studied forms of maladministration. In contrast to an agency that shirks its statutory duties or drifts away
from Congress’s policy goals, one engaged in sabotage aims deliberately to kill
or nullify a program it administers. Agencies sabotage because presidents ask
them to. Facing pressure to dismantle statutory programs in an environment
where securing legislation from Congress is difficult and politically costly, presidents pursue retrenchment through the administrative state.
Building on this positive theory of administrative sabotage, this Article considers legal responses. The best response, this Article contends, is not reforms to
the cross-cutting body of administrative law that structures most agency action. Rather, the risk of sabotage is better managed through changes to how
statutory programs are designed. Congress’s choices about agency leadership,
the concentration or dispersal of authority to implement statutory programs,
the breadth of statutory delegations, and other matters influence the likelihood
that sabotage will succeed or fail. When lawmakers create or modify federal
programs, they should design them to be less vulnerable to sabotage by the very
agencies that administer them.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in an effort to address the
market failures that triggered the 2008 financial crisis. 1 Following the recommendations of an article coauthored by then-Professor Elizabeth Warren, 2 the
Act sought to regulate “unsafe” financial products that Congress believed imposed a variety of negative externalities on society. 3 Title X of Dodd-Frank,
known as the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and charged it with enforcing
eighteen consumer financial laws. 4
In its early years under Director Richard Cordray, the CFPB pursued its statutory mission with zeal. The Bureau aggressively investigated predatory lenders,
mortgage companies, and credit-card companies. 5 Information from supervision and enforcement drove rulemaking in areas such as payday lending 6 and

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the United States Code).
2. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008).
3. See. e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 501–533 (regulating insurance markets); id. §§ 601–628
(regulating depository institutions); id. §§ 1400–1498 (regulating mortgages).
4. Id. § 1011 (establishing CFPB); id. §§ 1021(a), (c) (authorizing CFPB to enforce federal consumer financial laws); id. § 1022(12) (enumerating consumer financial laws the Bureau
administers).
5. See Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1076–77 (2016).
6. See Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Rule to End
Payday Debt Traps (June 2, 2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CFPB
_Proposes_Rule_End_Payday_Debt_Traps.pdf [perma.cc/9W9S-DFQW].
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debt collection. 7 Within five years, the Bureau was returning an average of $43
million per week from financial services companies to consumers. 8
But in December 2017, Cordray resigned to run for governor of Ohio, 9
and President Trump used the Federal Vacancies Reform Act 10 to replace him
with Mick Mulvaney, the director of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). 11 A long-time ally of the payday lending industry, 12 Mulvaney once
sponsored legislation to abolish the CFPB and stated at a House hearing that
he didn’t “like the fact that CFPB exists.” 13
At the helm of an agency he “detest[ed],” 14 Mulvaney moved to cripple it.
Mulvaney declined to request money to fund the Bureau’s operations; 15 installed “policy associate directors” 16 to shadow Bureau chiefs protected by the

7. See Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Board Meeting
(June 8, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-cfpbdirector-richard-cordray-consumer-advisory-board-meeting-june-2017 [perma.cc/JS23-XE88].
8. CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DORMANT: THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 15 tbl.1 (2019),
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf
[perma.cc/96CA-YD26].
9. Sylvan Lane, Former Consumer Bureau Director Cordray Announces Run for Ohio
Governor, HILL (Dec. 5, 2017, 1:44 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/363344-former-consumer-bureau-director-cordray-announces-run-for-ohio-governor [perma.cc/L9HA-23M4].
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349d.
11. See Renae Merle, The CFPB Now Has Two Acting Directors. And Nobody Knows Which
One Should Lead the Federal Agency, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/business/wp/2017/11/24/the-cfpb-now-has-two-acting-directors-and-nobody-knowswhich-one-should-lead-the-federal-agency [perma.cc/EXH8-VNEU]. In one of the stranger episodes of the Trump administration, Cordray appointed Leandra English as the CFPB’s deputy director before he left office; she and Mulvaney both claimed the right to lead the agency. A district
court rejected English’s motion for a preliminary injunction recognizing her right to lead the agency,
and English abandoned the case before it proceeded further. English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307
(D.D.C. 2018); see also Sylvan Lane, Biden Consumer Bureau Pick Could Take Over Agency on Inauguration Day, HILL (Jan. 19, 2021, 4:47 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/534884-bidenconsumer-bureau-pick-could-take-over-agency-on-inauguration-day [perma.cc/YW9L-GWGZ].
12. See George Zornick, Why Loan Sharks, Car Salesmen, and Payday Lenders Love Mick
Mulvaney, NATION (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-loansharks-car-salesmen-and-payday-lenders-love-mick-mulvaney [perma.cc/UAJ4-BK7Z].
13. Merle, supra note 11.
14. Devin Leonard & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Mick Mulvaney Is Having a Blast Running the
Agency He Detests, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 25, 2018, 5:28 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-25/mick-mulvaney-on-the-cfpb-we-re-still-elizabeth-warren-schild [perma.cc/KZP5-PATF] (cleaned up).
15. Kate Berry, Mulvaney Requests ‘Zero’ Money for CFPB, AM. BANKER (Jan. 18, 2018,
10:11 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/mulvaney-requests-zero-money-for-cfpb
[perma.cc/5DPH-J2LZ].
16. Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in Destroying a Bureaucracy from
Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/magazine/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump.html [perma.cc/3CVC-ZNAT].
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civil service laws; 17 rescinded, stayed, or delayed major rules on payday lending, overdraft fees, and student loan servicing; 18 and lent the Bureau’s support
to a constitutional challenge to the Bureau’s structure, in which the petitioner
asked the Supreme Court to “invalidate Title X.”19 According to one commentator, these actions left the CFPB in a “vegetative state.” 20
Mulvaney’s attack on the CFPB and the Bureau’s attack on Title X under
him highlight an important gap in our understanding of the U.S. administrative state. From the Affordable Care Act to laws protecting consumers, financial markets, and the environment, major statutory programs are administered
by executive departments and administrative agencies. 21 Scholars have long
appreciated that Congress’s delegation of authority to agencies creates risks of
slacking, drift, and capture: agencies might perform their functions lethargically, 22 depart from Congress’s preferences in administering a program, 23 or

17. Kate Berry, Meet Mulvaney’s ‘Politicos’: Six Senior Staff Remaking the CFPB, AM.
BANKER (May 7, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/meet-mick-mulvaneys-politicos-six-senior-staff-remaking-the-cfpb [perma.cc/F7UP-C97L].
18. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Comment: The Political
Economy of the Removal Power, 134 HARV. L. REV. 352, 372 (2020).
19. See CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION 1–2 (2018), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_semi-annual-report_spring-2018.pdf [perma.cc/6R33-CDNS]; Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 19, Seila L. LLC
v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7).
20. Sitaraman, supra note 18, at 373 (quoting Bess Levin, Mick Mulvaney Won’t Rest Until
He’s Exorcised Elizabeth Warren from the C.F.P.B., VANITY FAIR (May 25, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/05/mick-mulvaney-elizabeth-warren-exorcism [perma.cc/U4XR-8F92]).
21. In federal statutory law, executive agencies, executive departments, and independent
regulatory commissions are distinct kinds of entities. The differences among these kinds of institutions are for the most part unimportant to my goals in this Article. Thus, I use “agencies” as
a shorthand to refer to all three. I use “statutory program” to refer to legislation that is administered, in whole or part, by an agency or executive department.
22. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 70 (2010) (“[A]n enacting legislative coalition, mindful that the stickiness
of the status quo will make legislative override of bureaucrats difficult, will want to safeguard in
advance against bureaucrats deviating from the coalition’s preferences based upon bureaucrats’
own policy preferences, careerism, propensity to shirk, or acquiescence to capture.”); Matthew
C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 110 (2005) (noting that private enforcement regimes
can correct “the tendency of government regulators to underenforce certain statutory requirements because of political pressure, lobbying by regulated entities, or the laziness or self-interest
of the regulators themselves” (footnotes omitted)).
23. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 48
(1999) (“[G]iven that delegation implies surrendering at least some residual rights of control
over policy, legislators will be loath to relinquish authority in politically sensitive policy areas
where they cannot be assured that the executive will carry out their intent.”); Matthew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 438–39
(1989) (“Once a policy is enacted, the agency must implement it. In so doing, the agency may
shift the policy outcome away from the legislative intent . . . .”).
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consistently advance the interests of a regulated industry. 24 But with a handful
of recent exceptions, 25 scholars have not focused on the possibility that agencies might affirmatively attack programs they administer—a phenomenon
this Article terms “administrative sabotage.”
Administrative sabotage raises thorny questions. An influential strand of
public choice scholarship views agencies as “budget maximizers” that continuously undersupply policy outcomes desired by Congress while maximizing
their own budgets. 26 Why, contrary to this image, would an agency aim to put
itself out of business? Is sabotage different than agency slacking and drift or
merely an extreme form of those phenomena? Given the political and legal
checks on agencies, how can they successfully sabotage a statutory program?
This Article offers a theoretical and legal account of administrative sabotage that answers those questions. The core claim is that presidents use agencies to pursue statutory retrenchment that is costly, if not impossible, to obtain
directly from Congress. This affects our understanding of what agencies are.
Agencies not only enforce, elaborate, and implement statutory policy but can
undermine and dismantle the programs they administer.
I begin by making the case that administrative sabotage reflects a distinct
mode of agency action. Part I offers additional examples of administrative sabotage, distinguishes sabotage from other kinds of maladministration, and explains why sabotage is normatively objectionable.
Part I also explains that sabotage exists in something of a legal grey area.
The use of agency power to attack statutory programs encroaches on Congress’s legislative authority, is in tension with the executive’s constitutional
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” 27 and violates statu-

24. See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1, 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David
A. Moss eds., 2014) (“Regulatory capture is the process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests
of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.” (emphasis omitted)).
25. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment,
108 GEO. L.J. 495, 548 (2020); Madeline June Kass, Presidentially Appointed Environmental
Agency Saboteurs, 87 UMKC L. REV. 697 (2019); Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on
the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543 (2019). Two
recent works offer broader perspectives on issues related to administrative sabotage. In a crossnational study, Michael Bauer and Stefan Becker identify sabotage as one of four strategies that
populists who are elected to office use to “transform public administration according to their
anti-pluralist ideology.” Michael W. Bauer & Stefan Becker, Democratic Backsliding, Populism,
and Public Administration, 3 PERSPS. ON PUB. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 19 (2020). Focusing on
the Trump administration, Jody Freeman and Sharon Jacobs examine structural deregulation, a
set of strategies that track what this Article terms “systemic” sabotage. Jody Freeman & Sharon
Jacobs, Structural Deregulation, 135 HARV. L. REV. 585 (2021).
26. The classic work is WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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tory provisions that contemplate good-faith policy implementation. But concerns about intruding on a coordinate branch of government frequently prevent courts from effectively checking administrative sabotage.
Having defined administrative sabotage, Part II turns to its origins. Administrative sabotage is a tool for retrenching federal statutory programs. Demand for it originates in larger political and ideological opposition to an
activist federal government. Yet sabotage would not occur were it not for other
long-term trends in U.S. law and politics.
Those trends weaken presidents’ ability to secure new legislation while
strengthening their power over programs that have already been enacted into
law. On one hand, the complexity of the legislative process and the distinctive
politics of statutory retrenchment make it difficult for presidents to secure legislation rolling back enacted programs. On the other hand, Congress has delegated significant authority to agencies, presidents have expanded the White
House’s ability to control agencies through “presidential administration,”
congressional oversight has been weakened by the emergence of polarized political parties, and courts are increasingly open to reconfiguring or dismantling statutory programs based on creative legal arguments.
Constrained on the one hand and empowered on the other, presidents
pursue statutory retrenchment that Congress will not give them through the
administrative state. In Part III, I catalogue the tools available to a motivated
administration for sabotaging statutory programs and analyze the likelihood
that the tools will be checked by Congress or the courts. Overall, checks on
administrative sabotage are inconsistent, and their effectiveness depends on
contingent historical conditions such as partisan control of Congress. Sabotage, then, is not just a distinct mode of agency action but likely represents a
new normal. 28 Particularly during conservative administrations, agencies are
likely to use their delegated authority to attack disfavored programs.
Administrative sabotage complicates traditional accounts of the bureaucracy. After briefly highlighting these theoretical implications, Part IV considers
legal responses. Although existing checks on sabotage are weak, changes to procedural requirements, statutory and institutional design, and the law of judicial
review could potentially counteract it. A crucial question about such reforms
is whether sabotage is best addressed through cross-cutting reforms that apply
to agencies in general or through changes to specific agencies and programs.
I argue that cross-cutting reforms are a poor response to the risk of sabotage. Subjecting agencies to new procedural and analytical requirements and
expanding the scope of judicial review would make sabotage more difficult at
the margin, but these reforms would also impede legitimate efforts to imple-

28. Accord Nicholas Bagley, Executive Power and the ACA, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR
REVOLUTION: HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT TRANSFORMED POLITICS, LAW, AND HEALTH
CARE IN AMERICA 192, 198 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Abbe R. Gluck eds., 2020); cf. James A. Morone,
Partisanship, Dysfunction, and Racial Fears: The New Normal in Health Care Policy?, 41 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 827 (2016).
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ment statutory policy. Instead, I argue that the risk of sabotage is better addressed through statutory and institutional design. A host of choices affect
statutory programs’ resilience against sabotage. While the risk of sabotage
cannot be eliminated, it complicates and in some cases reorients long-running
debates about the design of statutory programs.
I.

FUNDAMENTALS

Consider the following executive actions:
•

The president appoints an EPA administrator who opposed federal environmental regulation as a state lawmaker. In her first speech to the
agency, she announces, “We’re going to do more with less and we’re
going to do it with fewer of you.” 29 The administrator fires attorneys in
the agency’s enforcement office or moves them to program offices, leaving no one to work on pending enforcement matters. Enforcement all
but stops. Over the next two years, the agency’s budget is reduced by
35.5 percent. 30

•

The attorney general sends a letter to Congress stating that lawsuits
caused the president and the Department of Justice “to conduct a new
examination” of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which revealed
that the Act violates the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment. The letter indicates that the Department will no longer
defend the legislation. 31 The Supreme Court subsequently holds it unconstitutional. 32

•

Drawing on authority “to adjust the organization of the Department,”
the secretary of agriculture announces that the department’s National
Institute of Food and Agriculture and Economic Research Service will
both be relocated from Washington, D.C., to Kansas City. 33 Long-time
employees are “forced to decide within months whether to uproot their
lives or quit.” 34 The transfers decimate the agencies. Two-thirds of affected workers leave their positions. 35

29. CHRISTOPHER SELLERS ET AL., ENV’T DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, THE EPA
UNDER SIEGE: TRUMP’S ASSAULT IN HISTORY AND TESTIMONY 12 (2017), https://envirodatagov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Part-1-EPA-Under-Siege.pdf [perma.cc/3NM4-L8HG].
30. Id. at 12–15, 61–62 (describing the tenure of EPA administrator Anne Gorsuch).
31. Letter on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act from Att’y Gen. Eric H.
Holder, Jr., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defensemarriage-act [perma.cc/HFM9-T7TD].
32. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
33. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, JOHN A. DEARBORN & DESMOND KING, PHANTOMS OF A
BELEAGUERED REPUBLIC: THE DEEP STATE AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 115 (2021) (quoting
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 1024 (1958), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 160 (2019)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 116.
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•

The Merit Systems Protection Board requires a quorum of two members to operate. 36 After the board loses a quorum, the president fails to
nominate new members, leaving the board unable to adjudicate alleged
violations of the civil service laws. 37

•

After failing to persuade Congress to repeal the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), 38 the president announces that “we’re doing it a different
way.” 39 Agencies promulgate regulations that expand the availability of
“junk” insurance plans, eliminate the ACA’s core protections, and make
it more difficult for people to enroll in ACA plans. 40 The Department
of Justice argues to the Supreme Court that “the ACA should not be
allowed to remain in effect.” 41
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Each of these cases involves actions that are the ordinary stuff of the administrative process: appointments, office reorganizations, budgeting, rulemaking, and public communications. But the actions also differ from the
textbook image of agency administration, insofar as they seem designed to
undermine programs that the executive is charged with administering. This
tension raises the question whether it is coherent—and useful—to view administrative sabotage as a distinctive mode of agency action.
This Part makes the case that it is. Administrative sabotage is defined by
intent: an agency aims to kill or nullify a statutory program. Section I.A develops
this definition. Section I.B considers sabotage’s relationship to agency slacking,
drift, and capture. Section I.C explores why administrative sabotage is normatively objectionable and rebuts the argument that the president’s popular mandate makes sabotage democratically legitimate. Finally, Section I.D explores
the reasons that courts, for the most part, do not directly police sabotage.

36. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LACK OF
BOARD QUORUM AND LACK OF BOARD MEMBERS 1 (2021), https://www.mspb.gov/FAQs_Absence_of_Board_Quorum_September_14_2021.pdf [perma.cc/CCR8-QHEM].
37. See Eric Katz, MSPB Likely to Remain Powerless as Senate Panel Fails to Advance
Trump’s Nominees, GOV’T EXEC. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2018/11
/mspb-likely-remain-powerless-senate-panel-fails-advance-trumps-nominees/153100 [perma.cc
/7DJL-GNUP].
38. Susan Cornwell, Republicans Fail Again to Kill Off Obamacare in Senate, REUTERS
(Sept. 25, 2017, 1:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare/republicans-failagain-to-kill-off-obamacare-in-senate-idUSKCN1C00BT [perma.cc/UC6F-KBVC].
39. President Trump Calls the Show on Our 30th Anniversary!, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2018/08/01/president-trump-calls-theshow [perma.cc/TG9J-5WZ5].
40. See Nicholas Bagley & Abbe R. Gluck, Opinion, Trump’s Sabotage of Obamacare Is
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/opinion/trumpobamacare-illegal.html [perma.cc/63Y7-B8WX].
41. Brief for the Fed. Respondents at 43, California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021) (No.
19-840).
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A. Defining Administrative Sabotage
An agency can sabotage many things: economic conditions, a presidential
administration, a business or industry. This Article focuses on the sabotage of
statutory programs by agencies that administer them.
In defining administrative sabotage, I draw on work in law and public
administration on related forms of sabotage. John Brehm and Scott Gates
study bureaucrats in state and federal bureaucracies and classify their actions
as “working, shirking, and sabotage.” 42 They define sabotage as bureaucratic
action that “deliberately undermin[es] the policy objectives of their superiors.” 43 Marissa Martina Golden studies executive agencies’ responsiveness to
the president’s policy agenda and approaches “sabotage” as bureaucratic action that undermines the president. 44 In a formal model of legislative delegation to an imperfectly controlled, expert bureaucrat, Sean Gailmard defines
“subversion” as any action outside the discretionary policy bounds set by the
legislature. 45
The first point suggested by this literature is that administrative sabotage
takes place within a principal-agent relationship. 46 The principal in this relationship is Congress. The agent is the administrative agency that administers
the program. 47
Second, administrative sabotage involves a specific stance on the part of
the agency toward the program it administers. The agency does not over- or
underenforce a policy relative to a hypothesized baseline, 48 or shift statutory
policy within the “space” a statute creates, 49 but seeks to eliminate a program

42. JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC
RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 21 (1997) (cleaned up).
43. Id. at 21.
44. See MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 17 (2000) (finding little evidence that bureaucratic sabotage occurred during the Reagan administration).
45. Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion, 18 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 536, 537 (2002).
46. See BREHM & GATES, supra note 42, at 25.
47. This view of agencies follows from the black-letter definition of an agency: “[A]n
agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). It also comports with the standard view of
agencies in positive political theory. See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Formal Models of Bureaucracy, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 353 (2012). It bears noting, however, that agencies are subject
to some degree of control by the president, the boundaries of which are deeply contested. See
Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
48. See Gailmard & Patty, supra note 47, at 365–66.
49. See Peter L. Strauss, Essay, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146–47 (2012) (explaining that when
Chevron deference applies to an agency’s statutory interpretation, “Congress has created the
agency’s freedom to act within its space anticipating presidential oversight”).
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it administers. Identifying sabotage thus requires analysis of agency decisionmakers’ intent. The intent to kill or nullify a statutory program distinguishes sabotage as a mode of agency action. 50
Third, administrative sabotage can target an entire statutory program,
such as the ACA, or a discrete aspect of a program, such as the ACA’s minimum essential coverage provisions. Every presidential administration likely
engages in some small-bore forms of sabotage. As the scope of sabotage expands, however, so do the normative concerns it raises. More on those concerns in a moment.
Fourth, administrative sabotage can succeed, fail, or produce a range of
outcomes in between. Given the stickiness of enacted law, it is not surprising
that many attempts at sabotage fail. But the line between successful and unsuccessful sabotage is uncomfortably thin. Consider the Trump Justice Department’s support for Texas v. United States, the most recent constitutional
challenge to the ACA. 51 There, a stay pending appeal was all that prevented a
district court from invalidating the Act in its entirety. 52
Based on the foregoing, this Article defines administrative sabotage as follows: an agency engages in administrative sabotage when it deliberately seeks
to kill or nullify a statutory program, in whole or part, that Congress has charged
the agency with administering. 53
B. Sabotage, Slacking, Drift, and Capture
Administrative sabotage is related to, but different from, other forms of
agency action that scholars have explored at length. We can sharpen our understanding of sabotage by comparing it to these phenomena.

50. Cf. Freeman & Jacobs, supra note 25, at 627 (“The real question is whether . . . agency
reforms that have potential to reduce functional capacity appear to have been taken in good faith
with a legitimate purpose other than weakening the agency’s ability to perform its legislative
tasks.”); Randy E. Barnett, The President’s Duty of Good Faith Performance, REASON: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 12, 2015), https://reason.com/volokh/2015/01/12/the-presidents-duty-ofgood-fa-2 [perma.cc/DJE9-8XVP] (arguing that determining whether an enforcement policy
complies with the Take Care Clause requires analysis of whether nonenforcement is motivated
by disagreement with the law not being enforced).
51. See infra notes 113–118 and accompanying text.
52. Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665, 690 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part, 945
F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2020), rev’d sub nom. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
53. I use “kill” to refer to agency action that deprives a statutory program of the force of
law and “nullify” to refer to action that leaves a program in place but deprives it of any practical
effect.
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First, administrative sabotage is not the same as the undersupply of policy
outcomes Congress desires, variously known as slacking, 54 shirking, 55 or nonenforcement. 56 For example, Congress might direct the Internal Revenue Service to audit ten thousand high-income taxpayers per year and provide the
requisite authority and appropriations. 57 If the agency simply refuses to conduct the audits, it is slacking. If it refuses to perform the audits and fires all of
its personnel who are capable of performing the audits, it is engaged in slacking and sabotage.
As this suggests, what distinguishes sabotage from mere slacking is the
agency’s intent to kill or nullify the program. The agency does not simply take
its foot off the pedal but totals the vehicle, making it impossible for later
agency heads to restart. Where sabotage succeeds, its effects are more lasting
than mere slacking. 58 Seen in terms of the agency’s fealty to its statutory mandate, this is an important difference of kind. The agency does not simply fail
to enforce but uses nonenforcement as a means of eliminating or disabling the
sabotaged program.
Sabotage also differs from agency “drift,” or the “risk that implemented
policy will differ from what the enacting legislative coalition would prefer.” 59
If we model statutory policy along a simple liberal-to-conservative spectrum,
a conservative agency might implement a liberal statute more conservatively
than the enacting Congress expected, and vice versa.
Most analyses of agency drift assume that it occurs within the space created by the statute. 60 For example, the Federal Trade Commission might adopt
an understanding of anticompetitive conduct that is more or less restrictive

54. E.g., Stephenson, supra note 22, at 110.
55. E.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (1987).
56. See, e.g., Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 795 (2010).
57. Cf. H.R. 1200, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (2021) (directing IRS to audit 50 percent of individual tax returns with an income over $10 million a year).
58. Analyzing the impact of Secretary Purdue’s office moves at the Department of Agriculture, see supra text accompanying note 35, the House Appropriations Committee concluded
that the two affected offices “are shells of their former selves” and that “the loss of institutional
knowledge each agency has suffered will take years to overcome.” Ryan McCrimmon, Farm
Spending Bill Set for House Markup, POLITICO (July 9, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2020/07/09/farm-spending-bill-set-for-house-markup789049 [perma.cc/G3WP-MP4J], quoted in SKOWRONEK ET AL., supra note 33, at 116.
59. Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 338 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
60. See, e.g., id. at 337; J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2003); McCubbins et al., supra note 23, at
438–39.

March 2022]

Administrative Sabotage

765

than Congress contemplated. 61 Sabotage is different. The agency does not implement a statute in a manner that departs from Congress’s preferences but
aims to kill the program itself.
Finally, administrative sabotage is different than agency or regulatory
capture, the “process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently
or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests
of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.” 62 As
this definition suggests, capture is a process through which public authority is
used for private ends. A regulated industry might capture an agency and direct
it to engage in sabotage. But the industry might also have the agency protect
it from regulation, protect it from competition, or even overregulate. 63 Conceptually, then, whether an agency has been captured is distinct from whether
the agency is engaged in sabotage.
C. Normative Objections to Administrative Sabotage
The basic objection to administrative sabotage is that it is incompatible
with democratic government under the Constitution. Even fervent critics of
the administrative state acknowledge Congress’s authority to define national
policy through law, create executive departments and agencies, and charge
them with enforcing and elaborating statutory policies. 64
Administrative sabotage subverts that model. Rather than use delegated
authority to enforce and elaborate statutory policy, an agency engaged in sabotage uses that authority to undermine the program it administers. In structural constitutional terms, this use of delegated authority is at odds with the
principle of legislative supremacy. 65 To the extent that it is done with the president’s blessing, sabotage also breaches the executive’s duty to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.” 66 Although many aspects of the Take Care
Clause’s meaning are unresolved, 67 virtually everyone agrees that it requires

61. See John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent” and
the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259 (1988).
62. Carpenter & Moss, supra note 24.
63. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality,
and Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 223–25 (2012).
64. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (“No
one doubts Congress’s power to create a vast and varied federal bureaucracy.”).
65. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (rejecting
argument that the Take Care Clause empowers the president to disregard enacted law on the
grounds that such a power would “cloth[e] the President with a power entirely to control the
legislation of congress, and paralyze the administration of justice”).
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
67. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835 (2016).
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good-faith execution of duly enacted laws. 68 Administrative sabotage is badfaith, not good-faith, administration. 69
The maladministration of the laws inherent to sabotage affects the beneficiaries of sabotaged programs. Programs protecting health, the environment, and markets seek to overcome collective action problems to address
pressing social challenges. When those programs are sabotaged, their ability
to provide the goods that lawmakers enacted them to provide is compromised.
But there is more to dislike about sabotage. The programs that sabotage
undermines are enacted through a legislative process that is designed to accommodate competing interests and provide opponents of those programs
the opportunity to voice their objections. Scholars have advanced powerful
arguments that Congress’s design entrenches minority rule, hampers responses to urgent collective action problems, and perpetuates white supremacy. 70 Yet for all of Congress’s flaws, enacted legislation has a strong claim to
democratic legitimacy. Enacted laws must navigate an obstacle course of veto
points and draw support from a wide range of representatives and senators. 71
Presidents are subject to none of these constraints. Insofar as sabotage privileges
the president’s views about the desirability of maintaining statutory programs
over congressional judgments expressed in law, sabotage is undemocratic.
Defending their attacks on the statutory programs they administer,
agency heads have argued that the president’s popular mandate legitimates
administrative sabotage. 72 In doing so, they draw on a body of doctrine and
scholarship that celebrates presidential control of agency action. 73 Proponents

68. See id. at 1858; Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful
Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2118 (2019); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 219 (2015);
Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 698 (2014).
69. As David Pozen has explored, the notion of bad faith is used to describe many kinds
of objectionable conduct in constitutional law and politics. Administrative sabotage involves a
“classic” form of bad faith: “the use of deception to conceal or obscure a material fact, a malicious
purpose, or an improper motive or belief, including the belief that one’s own conduct is unlawful.” David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 892 (2016).
70. See, e.g., ADAM JENTLESON, KILL SWITCH: THE RISE OF THE MODERN SENATE AND THE
CRIPPLING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2021); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2006); ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2d ed. 2003).
71. See infra text accompanying note 150.
72. For example, in remarks to a bank association, Mulvaney boasted that the CFPB was
“a different bureau” under him than under his predecessor Richard Cordray. That was simply
“the nature of the business” because “elections do have consequences.” Steve Cocheo, “Elections
Have Consequences,” Mulvaney Tells Bankers, BANKING EXCH. (Apr. 25, 2018, 6:58 PM),
https://www.bankingexchange.com/cfpb/item/7521-elections-have-consequences-mulvaneytells-bankers [perma.cc/AC7F-BNA2].
73. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001);
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23
(1995); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 105–06 (1994). This strand of legal scholarship elaborates on Theodore J. Lowi’s analysis of the “plebiscitary president,” which he argued had displaced the original constitutional
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of this “presidentialist” view argue that “because the President has a national
constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative
policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than
merely parochial interests.” 74 Thus, the argument goes, an agency that engages
in sabotage at the president’s behest does not act undemocratically, because it
merely channels the president’s views.
An initial problem with this defense of sabotage is that it misconstrues the
presidentialist arguments it invokes. Presidentialists argue that presidential
control of administrative agencies is necessary to maintain coherence among
programs, allocate resources efficiently, and strengthen the connection between the actions of unelected bureaucrats and electoral politics. 75 Thus, presidentialists defend presidential control over agencies because it promotes the
faithful execution of the laws. 76 By contrast, the presidentialist defense of administrative sabotage assumes that the president’s mandate makes it democratically legitimate for him to take any action that they believe advances the
national interest, no matter the lawfulness of the agency’s actions. No serious
presidentialist argues this.
The more fundamental problem with the defense is its assumption that
the president’s gestalt views about the continued desirability of a program are
a better reflection of democratic preferences than enacted law. That assumption invokes the president’s national constituency: because the president is
elected by voters nationwide, he ostensibly speaks for voters nationwide. But
there are a number of problems with the idea that the president’s preferences
should serve as a switch that can turn off programs enacted through regular
lawmaking processes.
To begin with, when considering the extent to which they represent voters, the proper comparison is not between the president and individual members of Congress, but between the president and Congress as a whole. 77
Congress as a collective body represents practically the same number of voters
as the president. 78 Thus, in terms of raw numbers of voters they represent,

conception of the presidency. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT 97–133 (1985); see
also Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1217, 1226 & nn.28–33 (2006).
74. Kagan, supra note 73, at 2335.
75. See id. at 2331–45.
76. See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020) (“[T]he Constitution gives
the President ‘the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties. Without
such power, the President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010))); Calabresi, supra note 73, at 58 (“It
is to [the President and officers directly accountable to him] that the text of Article II of the
Constitution entrusts the power of law execution, and upon them that the same text imposes the
duty that the laws be ‘faithfully executed.’ ”).
77. Nzelibe, supra note 73, at 1249.
78. The qualifier is necessary because residents of the District of Columbia vote for president but are not fully represented in Congress.

768

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:753

there is no reason to view the president’s views as more democratically legitimate than Congress’s.
One might think that, because the president must appeal to a national
constituency to win office, the president’s views are more likely to represent
the median national voter. But the idea that the president represents a national
constituency is questionable. As Jide Nzelibe shows, the rules governing presidential elections allow a candidate to win with the support of as little as 25
percent of the national electorate. 79 This creates incentives for presidents to
govern on behalf of narrow parochial interests rather than the entire nation.
Moreover, the argument that the president’s mandate legitimates sabotage ignores civic republican values that Congress is designed to foster. When
an agency engages in sabotage, its actions reflect the will of a single individual
whose actions are not guided by law or by predictable, rational norms. The
arbitrariness of this exercise of authority is in striking contrast to the kind of
deliberative, inclusive decisional process that proponents of civic republicanism celebrate. 80
Of course, recognizing that judgments reflected in legislation take priority
over the president’s views results in a form of democratic lag. Major legislation
is heavily negotiated and takes years if not decades to enact. Accordingly, legislation cannot capture popular preferences as quickly as executive action. But
major programs are designed with this lag in mind and delegate authority precisely because of the difficulty of amending enacted law. 81 Moreover, that conventional constitutional arrangements freeze Congress’s judgments in the face
of changing circumstances is usually thought to be a feature, not a bug, of the
constitutional scheme. Organizing social life around legislation gives individuals a voice in the norms that become law and allows them to organize their
affairs around a (comparatively) stable system of legal regulation. 82 A lag between popular preferences and enacted law is inherent in the system.
If sabotage is objectionable on constitutional, welfarist, and democratic
grounds, however, this is not to say that it can never be normatively justified.
Suppose, for example, that President Lincoln had used control of the executive
branch to undermine the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act in the decade prior to the Civil
War. 83 An intentional effort to subvert congressional regulation of slavery
would have qualified as sabotage. Yet, seen through modern eyes, no one would
say that it would have been normatively objectionable. To the contrary, admin-

79. Nzelibe, supra note 73, at 1234–37.
80. E.g., Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849 (2012); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992).
81. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 23, at 29.
82. See Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the Rule of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91, 107
(2007).
83. See generally STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850–1860 (1970).
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istrative sabotage of the Fugitive Slave Act would have vindicated the Constitution’s highest ideals. Arguments in favor of the Justice Department’s refusal
to defend the Defense of Marriage Act rely on the same logic. 84
But we should be clear about the logic of these arguments. The claim is
not that sabotage is compatible with the constitutional scheme. It is that, in
extraordinary circumstances, sabotage may be justified despite its tension with
that scheme.
D. Sabotage’s Legal Position
Although sabotage is objectionable on both constitutional and democratic grounds, it does not follow that courts will stop agencies from engaging
in it. In this Section, I argue that sabotage exists in a kind of legal grey area—
formally incompatible with the Constitution and agencies’ authorizing legislation, but mostly insulated from judicial scrutiny. This immunity reflects
courts’ hesitance to engage the question whether agency action is sabotage.
Because of that hesitance, challenges to administrative sabotage cannot rely
solely on the fact that it is sabotage.
I first explain the evidentiary and separation of powers problems that prevent courts from inquiring into whether agency action aims to kill or nullify a
statutory program. I then trace how those problems inform doctrine under
the Take Care Clause and § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
the two bodies of law that provide the most obvious avenues for challenging
administrative sabotage in court. Finally, I discuss three recent cases in which
litigants unsuccessfully challenged agency actions on the ground that they
were sabotage.
1.

Evidentiary and Separation of Powers Obstacles to Judicial Review of
Agency Sabotage

The understanding of administrative sabotage developed in this Part implies that agency officials act in a particular kind of bad faith when they engage
in sabotage: officials charged with administering a statutory program instead
use authority created by law to attack it.
As I argued above, the bad faith inherent in administrative sabotage is at
odds with the Constitution’s Take Care Clause. 85 It also conflicts with specific
delegations of statutory authority to agencies. When Congress charges an
agency with ensuring “that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive” 86 or with setting air pollution limits “requisite to protect the public health,”87 it assumes that the agency will act

84. E.g., Joseph Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1719 (2014).
85. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
86. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
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in good faith to advance policy objectives defined by law. Administrative sabotage is not that. The entire point is to dismantle a disfavored program.
But for two reasons, courts are unlikely to invalidate agency action based
on an agency’s failure to carry out a statutory mandate in good faith. The first
obstacle is evidentiary. Officials sometimes acknowledge they are engaged in
sabotage, 88 but it is simple to invent technocratic explanations for agency actions designed to undermine a statutory program, and government lawyers
routinely offer such explanations in court. 89 This creates a difficult evidentiary
problem for courts, because many tools of sabotage are also the stuff of goodfaith policy implementation.
Courts can order discovery into agency decisionmakers’ subjective motivations, but this highlights the second obstacle. If assessing decisionmakers’
subjective reasons would not violate the separation of powers, it nevertheless
requires courts to probe far into the administrative process. What were the
relevant decisionmakers’ thinking at the time of the agency’s action? Do they
take the oath of office seriously? Are they telling the truth?
Courts traditionally have avoided such inquiries and instead evaluated
agencies’ explanations for their actions in light of the contemporaneous administrative record. 90 As the Supreme Court explained in Department of Commerce v. New York, this approach to judicial review “reflects the recognition
that further judicial inquiry into ‘executive motivation’ represents ‘a substantial intrusion’ into the workings of another branch of Government and should
normally be avoided.” 91 To respect the executive branch’s prerogatives, courts
afford agency actions a “presumption of regularity.” 92
The influence of these problems is apparent in doctrine interpreting the
two bodies of law that provide the most obvious avenues for challenging administrative sabotage: the Take Care Clause and the APA.

88. See Robert Pear & Reed Abelson, Foiled in Congress, Trump Moves on His Own to
Undermine Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/us
/politics/trump-obamacare-executive-order.html [perma.cc/9897-YJMK].
89. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2019) (noting the Trump
administration’s contention that it sought to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census form
“to use in enforcing the Voting Rights Act”); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404, 2417 (2018)
(crediting the Trump administration’s contention that a proclamation implementing Trump’s
campaign promise to halt immigration from Muslim countries “sought to improve vetting procedures by identifying ongoing deficiencies in the information needed to assess whether nationals of particular countries present ‘public safety threats’ ”).
90. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573.
91. Id. (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
268 n.18 (1977)).
92. Note, The Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of the Executive Branch, 131
HARV. L. REV. 2431, 2432 (2018).
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The Take Care Clause

As already noted, the Take Care Clause obligates the president to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 93 Precedent interpreting the Take
Care Clause does not answer many questions it raises. 94 However, courts have
traditionally held that the Clause provides an affirmative basis for relief only
when an executive-branch actor is subject to a specific, nondiscretionary
duty. 95 Absent such a duty, allegations that an executive-branch actor failed to
execute the law in good faith do not state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 96 Consistent with this view, claims that an executive-branch actor violated the Clause by implementing statutory policy in bad faith appear to be a
nonstarter. My research did not locate a single case in which a federal court
held that the president or an agency acting under his control violated the Take
Care Clause by failing to execute, administer, or enforce a duly enacted law in
good faith. 97
3.

Administrative Law

The same evidentiary and separation of powers concerns are reflected in
doctrine interpreting the APA. The APA contains two chapters: one establishing procedures for “each authority of the Government of the United States,”98
and another that provides for review of agency action. 99 The centerpiece of the
chapter on judicial review, § 706, directs courts to hold unlawful and set aside

93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
94. See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 67, at 1836–38.
95. See, e.g., Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Can., 189 F. Supp. 3d 85, 99 (D.D.C. 2016).
This distinction traces to Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between “cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion” and those in
which “a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). When a court had jurisdiction, Marshall held, a
writ of mandamus would issue only to correct violations of the latter category of duties. Id. at
169; see also Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499 (1867) (reasoning that for a court
to police the president’s performance of discretionary duties under the Take Care Clause would
be “an absurd and excessive extravagance” (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170)).
96. See Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 189 F. Supp. 3d at 99.
97. Perhaps the closest that a court has come to affirmatively enforcing the Take Care
Clause is National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974). That case
involved President Nixon’s failure to implement a pay raise for federal employees that had been
approved by Congress. Employees petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling Nixon to implement the raise, as well as a declaratory judgment that Nixon had failed to comply with the law
mandating the raise. Id. at 591. The court concluded that Nixon had unlawfully failed to implement the pay raise but felt compelled “to show the utmost respect to the office of the Presidency
and to avoid, if at all possible, direct involvement by the Courts in the President’s constitutional
duty faithfully to execute the laws.” Id. at 616. Accordingly, the court limited itself to issuing a
declaratory judgment. Id.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
99. Id. §§ 701–706.
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agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 100
By its terms, § 706 seems to apply to administrative sabotage: what greater
“abuse of discretion” could there be than sabotaging a statutory program? But
the black letter formulation of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard carefully
avoids inquiry into executive motive—the crucial question in identifying sabotage. To withstand arbitrary-and-capricious review, an “agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’ ” 101 Moreover, judicial review ordinarily proceeds on the basis of a record compiled by the agency and submitted to the court. 102 Only when a party
makes a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” may a court order
discovery into “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers.” 103
Within this framework, a litigant challenging alleged sabotage cannot rest
on the fact that the agency acted in bad faith but must also show that the challenged action is substantively unreasonable. The agency will defend its action
as a permissible exercise of statutory discretion. Ordinarily, the litigant will
not be allowed to go beyond the administrative record to rebut that defense.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of Commerce v. New
York potentially changes this equilibrium in recognizing “pretext” as a basis
for finding agency action arbitrary and capricious. 104 At issue was the Commerce Department’s decision to include a citizenship question on the shortform 2020 census form. 105 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts held
that the addition of the citizenship question was not “substantively invalid”—
that is, that the addition of the citizenship question was within the Commerce
Department’s statutory authority and satisfied the ordinary arbitrary-and-capricious standard. 106 But Roberts went on to hold that the citizenship question
was unlawful “because it rested on a pretextual basis.” 107
To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on extrarecord discovery that
the district court ordered after finding that the Justice Department’s explanation of the Commerce Department’s actions involved bad faith or improper
behavior. 108 That discovery revealed that Commerce went to “great lengths”
100. Id. § 706(2)(A).
101. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
102. 2 KRISTEN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 10.5, at 1145–48 (6th ed. 2019).
103. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
104. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019).
105. Id. at 2561–62.
106. Id. at 2571 (concluding that the decision to reinstate the citizenship question “was
reasonable and reasonably explained, particularly in light of the long history of the citizenship
question on the census”).
107. See id. at 2573, 2576.
108. Id. at 2573–74; see also New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 339 F. Supp. 3d 144, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551.
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to elicit a request to include the citizenship question from the Justice Department and that Commerce and Justice’s rationale for including the citizenship
question—that citizenship data would “better enforce” the Voting Rights
Act—was “contrived.” 109 The Court remanded the matter to the Commerce
Department because its “sole stated reason” for the addition of the citizenship
question was pretextual. 110
Although a few examples of sabotage might be vulnerable to legal challenge on this ground, Department of Commerce will not have a major effect on
judicial review of administrative sabotage. The Court’s conclusion depended
on extrarecord discovery that the Supreme Court held was ordered prematurely. 111 More importantly, the Court held that “a court may not reject an
agency’s stated reasons for acting simply because the agency might also have
had other unstated reasons.”112 Thus, while invalidating the particular abuse
of power at issue in that case, Department of Commerce gave a roadmap for
using agency power to attack statutory programs. In the future, an agency
need only articulate a lawful statutory objective and support it with evidence
to avoid the fate of the citizenship question.
4.

Administrative Sabotage in the Courts

When we consider cases where litigants challenged agency action on the
ground that it was sabotage, courts have not applied the Take Care Clause or
§ 706 to examine whether agencies were in fact engaged in sabotage. Instead,
they have applied standard administrative law and jurisdictional doctrines to
evaluate the lawfulness of agency action or find cases nonjusticiable.
In Texas v. United States, a coalition of states alleged that President
Obama and agencies under him violated the Take Care Clause, the APA, and
the Immigration and Nationality Act in promulgating the DAPA program,
which temporarily exempted certain undocumented immigrants with American children from deportation. 113 Quoting statements that Obama made during negotiations on a failed comprehensive immigration reform bill, the
complaint alleged that the president “took an action to change the law.”114 The
theory, Josh Blackman explains, was that DAPA amounted to “a deliberate
effort to undermine the laws of Congress, not to act in good faith.” 115
109. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 2574 (agreeing “with the Government that the District Court should not
have ordered extra-record discovery when it did” but concluding that “the new material that the
parties stipulated should have been part of the administrative record . . . largely justified such
extra-record discovery as occurred”).
112. Id. at 2573.
113. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 614 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
114. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3, Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (No. 14cv-00254) (emphasis omitted).
115. Blackman, supra note 68, at 219.
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The district court preliminarily enjoined DAPA on the ground that it
should have been promulgated using notice-and-comment procedures. 116 A
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and added
that DAPA was invalid because it conflicted with the Immigration and Nationality Act. 117 Both courts declined to address plaintiffs’ argument that
“DAPA was not consciously and expressly adopted as a means to enforce the
laws of Congress or to conserve limited resources.” 118
City of Columbus v. Trump, decided four years later, followed the same
pattern. A group of cities contended that President Trump and various agencies charged with administering the ACA had violated the APA and the Take
Care Clause through “a relentless campaign to sabotage and, ultimately, to nullify the law.”119 The complaint alleged that the Trump administration aimed
“to pressure Congress to repeal the Act or, if that fails, to achieve de facto repeal through executive action alone.” 120 It cited a variety of administrative and
presidential actions that seemed to present clear-cut examples of sabotage. 121
The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ Take Care claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege the violation of a nondiscretionary duty. 122 The
court allowed plaintiffs’ APA claims to proceed past a motion to dismiss. 123
However, the court made clear that it would approach those claims as ordinary requests for judicial review of agency action. 124 The court did not suggest
that administrative sabotage, if proved, would violate the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
In Maryland v. United States, the State of Maryland alleged that “the President and his administration have waged, and continue to wage, a relentless
campaign to sabotage and nullify the ACA, through legislative and executive

116. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
117. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178, 186 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
118. Blackman, supra note 68, at 216. The district court “specifically” noted that it was not
addressing “Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their . . . constitutional claims under the Take
Care Clause/separation of powers doctrine.” Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677. The Fifth Circuit found
it “unnecessary, at this early stage of the proceedings, to address or decide the challenge based
on the Take Care Clause.” Texas, 809 F.3d at 146 n.3.
119. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, City of Columbus v. Trump, 453
F. Supp. 3d 770 (D. Md. 2020) (No. 18-cv-02364).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 2 (detailing various agency actions that had “promot[ed] insurance that does
not comply with the ACA’s requirements,” “slash[ed] funding for outreach strategies that have
been proven to encourage individuals, and healthy individuals in particular, to sign up for coverage,” “misus[ed] federal funds for advertising campaigns aimed at smearing the ACA and its
exchanges,” and “impos[ed] unnecessary and onerous documentation requirements”).
122. Columbus, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 803.
123. Id. at 795–96.
124. Id. at 796 (reasoning that “dismissal based solely on [the complaint’s] contents would
be premature here because a review of the administrative record is necessary to a determination
of whether the Secretary’s methodology was arbitrary and capricious”).
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action.” 125 Among other remedies, Maryland sought a declaration that would
have precluded the administration from supporting a lawsuit designed to nullify
the ACA. 126 Citing the Take Care Clause, the district court acknowledged that
the president’s authority to execute the laws “does not entail the authority to
disregard a federal statute.” 127 But the court ruled the case was not justiciable.128
Under the law as it now stands, administrative sabotage is unlawful but
unlikely to be remedied by the courts. Insofar as law regulates administrative
sabotage, prohibitions of it have the status of an “underenforced” norm.129
From the standpoint of constitutional and administrative law doctrine, an allegation that an agency is engaged in sabotage is sauce on the main dish. The
allegation might affect how a court applies standard review doctrines. In itself,
it is unlikely to provide a basis for judicial relief.
II.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SABOTAGE

Case studies such as the CFPB’s attack on the Consumer Financial Protection Act under Mick Mulvaney and the Trump’s administration’s assault
on the ACA provide empirical evidence that administrative sabotage is an actual phenomenon. But why administrative sabotage happens is still something
of a theoretical puzzle.
Consider William Niskanen’s “budget maximizing” theory of the bureaucracy. 130 Niskanen posited that agency employees want the same material
goods as most people. 131 While an agency does not generate profits that it can
pass on to owners and employees, it possesses private information about the
cost of regulating that it can use to dupe Congress into increasing its budget. 132
Bigger budgets, Niskanen posited, filter down to agency employees in the form
of higher wages, better work, and nicer parking spots. 133 So Niskanen predicted that bureaucrats would “maximize the total budget of their bureau during their tenure.” 134
For a Niskanenian agency, administrative sabotage is irrational. Why
would a budget-maximizing agency attack the very programs it administers—
up to requesting nothing to fund its operations?

125. 360 F. Supp. 3d 288, 312 (D. Md. 2019).
126. Second Amended Complaint at 35, Maryland, 360 F. Supp. 3d 288 (No. 18-cv-2849).
127. Maryland, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 317.
128. Id.
129. For a classic treatment of this concept, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
130. See NISKANEN, supra note 26.
131. See id. at 40 (pointing to greater opportunities for promotion and greater job security
as reasons for agency employee interest in larger budgets).
132. See id. at 29.
133. See id. at 40.
134. Id. at 42.
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To answer that question, it helps to move beyond simplified theories of
the bureaucracy and situate sabotage within larger trends in American politics, legislation, and administrative policymaking. In this Part, I sketch a theory of sabotage’s origins in three such trends: ideological opposition to an
activist federal government, the “stickiness” or entrenchment of programs
that are enacted into law, and the rise of an administrative state that is highly
responsive to the president’s preferences.
In brief, the argument is that sabotage is the product of the incentives,
constraints, and powers of the modern presidency. Presidents face intense
pressure to retrench statutory programs, but the textbook lawmaking process
is difficult and politically costly to navigate. 135 Facing this dilemma, the administrative state offers presidents an alternative way of attacking statutory
programs that imposes fewer barriers to action than, and offers many of the
same rewards as, formal statutory retrenchment.
Sections II.A and II.B review the dilemma for presidents created by political demands for statutory retrenchment and a legislative process that makes
satisfying those demands difficult. Section II.C shows how presidents, caught
on the horns of this dilemma, use control of agencies to pursue retrenchment
that they are unwilling or unable to get from Congress.
A. Demand for Statutory Retrenchment
Administrative sabotage is a mechanism for deconstructing, dismantling,
rolling back, or minimizing federal statutory programs. As such, it must be
understood within the context of broader opposition to federal state-building
in the United States. Theoretically, such opposition might come from either
the political left or the right. But for complicated historical reasons, opposition
to federal legislation and regulation comes predominantly from the right.
Thus, while left-wing politics occasionally generates demands to dismantle
statutory programs, 136 sabotage is an “asymmetric” phenomenon that is most
likely to occur under conservative presidents. 137
A few key moments in modern political history underscore the parties’
asymmetric incentives to engage in administrative sabotage. In the decades after
World War II, the Republican Party was captured by the modern conservative
movement. 138 Among the movement’s defining positions is a commitment to

135. For the distinction between “textbook” and “unorthodox” lawmaking processes, see
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING (5th ed. 2017).
136. See, e.g., A. Naomi Paik, Abolitionist Futures and the US Sanctuary Movement, RACE
& CLASS, Oct.–Dec. 2017, at 3.
137. Cf. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Essay, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018) (positing a similar asymmetry in use of “constitutional hardball”);
MATT GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS
AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 14 (2016) (showing that the parties are asymmetric in their
composition, approach to politics, and policymaking stances).
138. See generally GROSSMANN & HOPKINS, supra note 137; HEATHER COX RICHARDSON,
TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (2014).
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freedom, individualism, and economic liberty. 139 While this free-market, antiregulatory philosophy has been central to conservative politics since the New
Deal, Republican officeholders “have increasingly embraced a highly confrontational approach that eschews inside strategies premised on the pursuit of
compromise in favor of maximizing partisan conflict, emphasizing symbolic
acts of ideological differentiation, and engaging in near-automatic obstruction
of initiatives proposed by the opposition.” 140 After the Tea Party helped Republicans retake control of the House in 2010, members’ votes increasingly
aligned with Tea Party demands on both substantive and procedural issues.141
As illustrated by a Tea Partier’s demand to “keep the government’s hands
off my Medicare,” conservative opposition to federal regulation is both selective and informed by race, class, and notions of deservingness. 142 Thus, conservative demands to retrench federal regulation have not translated into
demands to, say, eliminate interior immigration enforcement or defund the
police. 143 Even so, opposition to federal regulation remains a defining feature
of conservative politics.
This stance was prominent in the early days of the Trump administration.
On the heels of Trump’s electoral college victory, Steve Bannon vowed the
new administration would fight for the “deconstruction of the administrative
state.” 144 “The way the progressive left runs,” Bannon argued, “is if they can’t
get it passed, they’re just going to put in some sort of regulation in an agency.” 145
Bannon promised: “That’s all going to be deconstructed and I think that’s why
this regulatory thing is so important.” 146

139. See generally ELIZABETH A. FONES-WOLF, SELLING FREE ENTERPRISE: THE BUSINESS
ASSAULT ON LABOR AND LIBERALISM, 1945–60 (1994).
140. GROSSMANN & HOPKINS, supra note 137, at 12.
141. RACHEL M. BLUM, HOW THE TEA PARTY CAPTURED THE GOP 87–89 (2020); Fishkin
& Pozen, supra note 137, at 933; THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY
AND THE REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 4 (2012).
142. See SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 141, at 60, 79–80. For a somewhat sympathetic account of these attitudes, which hesitates to ascribe them entirely to racial prejudice, see
KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN WISCONSIN
AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER (2016).
143. In fact, the size of the federal government has grown during periods of Republican
control. See, e.g., Lisa Rein, The Federal Government Puts Out a ‘Help Wanted’ Notice as Biden
Seeks to Undo Trump Cuts, WASH. POST (May 21, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://washingtonpost.com
/politics/2021/05/21/biden-trump-government-rebuilding [perma.cc/6HDS-LYF7] (noting that
size of federal bureaucracy grew 3.4 percent during Trump administration).
144. Max Fisher, Stephen K. Bannon’s CPAC Comments, Annotated and Explained, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/stephen-bannon-cpacspeech.html [perma.cc/723T-ZZ6N].
145. Id.
146. Id.
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B. Sticky Legislation
Politics may generate intense demand for presidents to dismantle statutory programs, but how to satisfy that demand is easier asked than answered.
For reasons familiar to scholars of deregulation, repealing enacted programs
is both difficult and politically treacherous. 147 Enacted programs thus tend to
become “sticky” or entrenched. 148
This stickiness has both structural and psychological explanations. 149 As
for structure, the many “veto points” in the federal legislative process insulate
enacted programs from repeal. 150 Suppose Congress enacts a new federal program. Following an election, party control of Congress switches, but the prior
majority party still controls a veto point such as the Senate filibuster. Control
of that veto point allows lawmakers now in the minority to protect the new
program.
The psychological explanation involves the way that “loss aversion” interacts with interest group dynamics. 151 Organizing collective action is a major
obstacle to passing any legislation. 152 Cutbacks to statutory programs, however,
“generally impose immediate pain on specific groups, usually in return for diffuse, long-term, and uncertain benefits.” 153 A credible threat to repeal a statutory program—at least one that generates benefits for statutory beneficiaries—
can accordingly be expected to mobilize intense interest-group opposition. 154
The unsuccessful effort to “repeal and replace” the ACA illustrates these
dynamics. 155 In the 2016 election cycle, virtually every Republican candidate
ran on a platform of repealing “Obamacare.” 156 President Trump’s victory

147. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 22, at 38; PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE
STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 18 (1994); HERBERT
KAUFMAN, BROOKINGS INST., ARE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IMMORTAL? (1976).
148. See Bryan D. Jones, Tracy Sulkin & Heather A. Larsen, Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151, 151–52 (2003).
149. See PIERSON, supra note 147, at 17–19; Jones et al., supra note 148.
150. See generally GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
WORK (2002) (showing how changing the legislative status quo requires that a certain number
of “veto players” in the political system agree to the change).
151. See PIERSON, supra note 147, at 18.
152. The classic work developing this point is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1965). As Olson explains, someone seeking to persuade Congress to enact legislation
must coordinate the actions of thousands of people and pay for collective goods such as legislative drafting and lobbying that no individual would rationally subsidize.
153. PIERSON, supra note 147, at 18.
154. Id. at 19–24.
155. See Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, The Dog That Almost Barked: What the ACA
Repeal Fight Says About the Resilience of the American Welfare State, 43 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 551 (2018).
156. David A. Fahrenthold & Jenna Johnson, Republicans’ Obamacare ‘Repeal and Replace’
Dilemma Joins Presidential Contest, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/health-law-repeal-and-replace-joins-republican-presidential-contest/2015/
08/18/b620ee94-45ce-11e5-846d-02792f854297_story.html [perma.cc/7TTH-ZBCU].
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gave Republicans control of the House, Senate, and presidency. But the
House’s passage of legislation repealing the ACA triggered a massive mobilization to defend the law. 157 With Republicans divided between far-right factions that favored using the ACA repeal to roll back Medicare and Medicaid
and centrists who favored more modest reforms, the repeal effort culminated
in a dramatic early morning vote on July 28, 2017. 158 With a simple thumbs
down, Senator John McCain killed the “Skinny Repeal,” effectively ending
congressional efforts to repeal the ACA. 159
This is not to say that enacted programs are set in stone. Scholars have
found that, on some measures, restructuring or termination of statutory programs is commonplace. 160 But the failed ACA repeal highlights the barriers a
president must overcome to successfully unwind an enacted program. In 2016
and 2017, Republicans ran on an anti-ACA platform, unified around the necessity of repealing the law, and controlled Congress, the presidency, and the
Supreme Court. Even with these advantages, repeal proved impossible.
C. The Administrative State as a Tool of Statutory Retrenchment
Imagine you are a president—probably a conservative one—elected with
a mandate to roll back a statutory program. Opposition to the program is central to your political appeal, and voters expect you to use the presidency to
deliver promised statutory retrenchment. But a credible threat to repeal the
program will mobilize intense interest-group opposition. Even if your party
controls Congress, the repeal effort is likely to fail. All of this imposes political
costs, diverting time and attention from other priorities and contributing to a
perception of fecklessness.
The basic logic of administrative sabotage is to use administrative agencies to do what is difficult or costly to accomplish through Congress. Through
control of administrative agencies, the president can kill or nullify a statutory
program or lay the groundwork for its repeal or nullification by Congress or
the courts. Seen from this perspective, the fact that presidents engage in sabo-

157. Christopher Ingraham, Here’s a List of Medical Groups Opposing the Cassidy-Graham
Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2017/09/22/heres-a-list-of-medical-groups-opposing-the-cassidy-graham-health-care-bill
[perma.cc/K62X-8KU9]; Hacker & Pierson, supra note 155, at 552.
158. The “Skinny Repeal” attempted to bridge differences among congressional Republicans by repealing central parts of the ACA while putting off the design of replacement legislation.
See H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Mary Ellen McIntire, McConnell Reveals ‘Skinny’ Bill
Text as Midnight Vote Looms, ROLL CALL (July 27, 2017, 10:51 PM), https://www.rollcall.com
/2017/07/27/mcconnell-reveals-skinny-bill-text-as-midnight-vote-looms [perma.cc/LY45-62Q4].
159. Peter W. Stevenson, How John McCain’s ‘No’ Vote on Health Care Played Out on the
Senate Floor, WASH. POST (July 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/07/28/how-john-mccains-no-vote-on-health-care-played-out-on-the-senate-floor
[perma.cc/J564-88TD].
160. Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, After Enactment: The
Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (2010).
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tage reflects the comparative costs and benefits of different modes of retrenching programs they don’t like. All else being equal, presidents might prefer to
retrench statutory programs through formal legislation. When that is difficult
or politically costly, administrative sabotage offers a close substitute.
Part III surveys tools available to a motivated administration to sabotage
a statutory program. This Section works with a wider lens and considers the
structural conditions that allow presidents to engage in administrative sabotage. Five features of the contemporary administrative state—none of which
is sufficient in itself—facilitate sabotage.
1.

Delegation

To begin, administrative sabotage takes advantage of Congress’s creation
of agencies and departments and its broad delegations of statutory authority
to them. Since the New Deal, Congress has created scores of agencies and executive departments and granted them power to regulate particular domains,
at times through open-ended delegations. 161 Contrary to critics, the story of
congressional delegation is not one of ever-increasing agency power. 162 But
there are enough statutory delegations—and they are sufficiently flexible—to
allow agencies to sabotage important statutory programs.
2.

Presidential Administration

If agencies were led by individuals who were committed to implementing
statutory mandates in good faith, Congress’s delegations of authority would
not create a risk of sabotage. But rather than empower independent administrators, public law in recent decades has expanded the president’s control over
them. When presidents face pressure to dismantle statutory programs, presidential administration is a transmission belt for sabotage.
As then-Professor Elena Kagan wrote in 2001, presidents beginning with
Reagan asserted authority to direct the actions of administrative agencies and

161. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T MANUAL (Nov. 2020 ed. 2020), https://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov [perma.cc/V8FT-STAS] (listing some four hundred federal administrative agencies).
162. In the leading empirical study of congressional delegation, David Epstein and Sharyn
O’Halloran found that major statutes’ “delegation ratio” (a measure of the discretion that Congress allowed agencies to exercise) declined slightly in the second half of the twentieth century.
EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 23, at 114–16. Later studies are consistent with Epstein and
O’Halloran’s finding that Congress adjusts the amount of authority it delegates to agencies in
response to information problems, the area in which Congress is regulating, and changes in party
control of Congress and the executive branch. See, e.g., Jordan Carr Peterson, All Their Eggs in
One Basket? Ideological Congruence in Congress and the Bicameral Origins of Concentrated Delegation to the Bureaucracy, 7 LAWS art. 19, https://doi.org/10.3390/laws7020019; Kathleen M.
Doherty & Jennifer L. Selin, Does Congress Differentiate? Administrative Procedures, Information Gathering, and Political Control (Mar. 27, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Michigan Law Review).
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portrayed agencies as an extension of the presidency. 163 Formal tools of “presidential administration” include the president’s power to nominate and appoint agency heads, executive orders, formal review of agency policymaking
via OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, regulatory czars and
interagency working groups, and control of agency budgets and proposed legislation. 164 More important than these formal tools is the White House’s informal power to direct agency action. Appointees’ commitment to toeing the
party line, back-channel communications, and the “shadow cabinet” allow the
White House to control what agencies do while “leaving no tracks.” 165
In the years since Kagan’s article appeared, presidential administration
has grown more powerful. At the level of constitutional doctrine, the Roberts
Court has broadly embraced the “unitary executive” theory, restricting Congress’s authority to protect agency heads from being removed by the president
and suggesting in dicta that any substantial limitation on the president’s authority to direct how the law is executed is incompatible with Article II. 166 Informal norms have shifted even further in the president’s favor. 167
3.

Partisanship and Polarization

In classic accounts of the U.S. separation of powers system, faithful execution of the law is ensured by Congress and the judiciary protecting their
own interests: ambition counteracts ambition. 168 But as Daryl Levinson and
Richard Pildes observe, “the rise of partisan politics worked a revolution in
the American system of separation of powers, radically realigning the incentives of politicians and officeholders.” 169
Today, party identification is a far better predictor of how government
officials will exercise their authority than the formal position they occupy in
Congress or the executive branch. 170 As elected officials and voters have come

163. See Kagan, supra note 73, at 2247.
164. See id. at 2270–80, 2284–303.
165. See, e.g., Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST (June 27,
2007), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/leaving_no_tracks [perma.cc/U5LGEYQQ] (describing Vice President Dick Cheney’s behind-the-scenes interventions to undercut
environmental rules).
166. See Blake Emerson, Liberty and Democracy Through the Administrative State: A Critique of the Roberts Court’s Political Theory, 73 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2022),
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3779457 [perma.cc/AJG6-2MPT]; Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct.
2183, 2197, 2205 (2020); Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784 (2021).
167. See Emerson, supra note 166 (manuscript at 11–18); Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke,
Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American
Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549 (2018).
168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
169. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2321 (2006).
170. Id. at 2326.
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to identify more strongly with their party, the parties have also become ideologically polarized. 171 According to a standard measure of lawmaker ideology,
the ideological difference between the average Republican member of Congress and the average Democratic member has increased nearly twofold since
the 1970s, with Republicans moving further to the extreme than Democrats. 172
Because of partisanship and polarization, one cannot assume that Congress will necessarily check administrative sabotage out of institutional selfinterest. To the contrary, “the degree and kind of competition between the
legislative and executive branches vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or
unified by political party.” 173 When, say, the Senate and the presidency are under unified party control, the Senate is unlikely to reject antiregulatory agency
heads out of an abstract commitment to faithful execution of the law. 174
Indeed, a president’s co-partisans in Congress and the judiciary are more
likely to support administrative sabotage than oppose it. The attack on the ACA
provides an example. In 2018, health-insurance company Anthem withdrew
from Wisconsin and Indiana in response to what it artfully described as “continual changes and uncertainty in federal operations, rules and guidance.” 175
Speaker Paul Ryan did not decry the unstable regulatory environment that
caused Anthem’s withdrawal from the two states. Instead, he cited the move
as evidence that “Obamacare is clearly collapsing” and called for replacing the
ACA “before more families get hurt.” 176
4.

Legal Culture

Changes in legal culture have also facilitated sabotage. Courts are increasingly willing to strike or reconfigure statutory programs based on creative legal arguments. This effectively gives opponents of statutory programs a second
opportunity to dismantle them after failing to prevail in the political process. 177
171. See MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME
DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS (2009); GROSSMANN & HOPKINS, supra note 137, at 75–79.
172. See NOLAN MCCARTY, POLARIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 30–31 (2019).
173. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 169, at 2315.
174. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmentalprotection-agency.html [perma.cc/ER9K-L72C] (noting Republicans’ support for the confirmation of Scott Pruitt as EPA administrator despite Pruitt having previously called for the dissolution of agency).
175. Dan Mangan & Bertha Coombs, Anthem Pulls Out of Obamacare Markets in Wisconsin
and Indiana for 2018, CNBC (Jun. 21, 2017, 3:22 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/21/anthempulls-out-of-obamacare-markets-in-wisconsin-and-indiana-for-2018.html [perma.cc/XT8V3BBQ].
176. Barnini Chakraborty, Anthem Pulls Out of ObamaCare Exchanges in Midwest, Fueling
GOP Repeal Push, FOX NEWS (June 21, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/anthem-pullsout-of-obamacare-exchanges-in-midwest-fueling-gop-repeal-push [perma.cc/7V2X-NWKG].
177. See, e.g., Sitaraman, supra note 18, at 364; Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 25, at 517.
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These legal challenges draw on well-developed networks of institutional
support. As Amanda Hollis Brusky, Steven Teles, and others have documented, the founders of the Federalist Society set out in the early 1980s “to
reorient the legal culture” against perceived liberal orthodoxy and lend intellectual legitimacy to the view that “the state exists to preserve freedom.” 178 From
modest beginnings at Yale and the University of Chicago, the society grew
into a network of more than forty thousand lawyers, with members or associates in the legal academy, think tanks, the executive branch, and the courts. 179
The success of the Federalist Society and the broader conservative legal
movement creates a number of conditions that facilitate administrative sabotage. The movement generates an endless stream of arguments designed to
undermine disfavored programs that can be adopted by conservative administrations. 180 The Federalist Society’s publications, conferences, meetings, and
informal gatherings help to legitimize those arguments. Lawyers, academics,
and experts aligned with the movement can be expected to support those arguments, “carrying the ideas of the Federalist Society into their roles as legal professionals, including judges, academics, executive branch officials, litigators, or
friends of the court.” 181 Perhaps most importantly, the society now serves as the
de facto credentialing authority for conservative judges and even law clerks. 182
Training and socialization provided by the organization increase the odds that
courts will adopt creative antiregulatory arguments that agencies advance. 183
5.

The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action

A final feature of the administrative state that facilitates administrative sabotage is what Terry Moe and William Howell term the “presidential power of

178. See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 5, 22 (2015); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008).
179. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 178, at 1–2.
180. The decade-long campaign to kill the ACA through litigation provides an illustration.
See Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation Decade, 108
GEO. L.J. 1471 (2020); HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 178, at 21–22.
181. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 178, at 25.
182. See Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks: Probing the Ideological Linkage Between Judges and Justices, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 333, 348, 356 (2014).
183. The transformation of the federal judiciary under President Trump suggests the importance of this development. Trump appointed three Supreme Court justices, 30 % of active
appeals-court judges, and 27 % of active district-court judges. About 84 % of Trump’s lowercourt appointees were white and 76 % were men. Moreover, Trump’s circuit court appointees
“are more uniformly conservative than any of his recent Republican predecessors.” Elena Mejía
& Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, It Will Be Tough for Biden to Reverse Trump’s Legacy of a Whiter,
More Conservative Judiciary, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 21, 2021), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-made-the-federal-courts-whiter-and-more-conservative-and-that-will-be-tough-forbiden-to-reverse [perma.cc/3FRS-ZKAV]; see also Stacy Hawkins, Trump’s Dangerous Judicial
Legacy, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 20 (2019).
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unilateral action.” 184 Under the Constitution, the executive branch, Congress,
and the courts operate in a perpetual power competition, in which the actual
power of each branch depends on whether and how it is checked by the others. 185
But the competition does not proceed on a level playing field. Congressional action requires a proponent of legislation to overcome major collective
action problems. 186 Courts only act in response to a proper case or controversy, 187 and action by an appellate court generally requires a lower court to
act first. 188 By contrast, when presidents wish to challenge the status quo, “they
can simply do it—quickly, forcefully, and (if they like) with no advance notice.” 189 This gives presidents two advantages in disputes over power allocation.
Barriers to presidential action are lower than the barriers to action by Congress or the courts. And presidents’ power to act unilaterally allows them to
shift facts on the ground and force other branches to respond to their actions.
This does not mean that presidents are free to do whatever they want. As
Moe and Howell argue, however, the big picture is one of “presidents who move
strategically and moderately to promote their imperialistic designs—and do so
successfully over time, gradually shifting the balance of power in their favor.”190
This creates a welcoming environment for administrative sabotage.
Knowing that Congress and the judiciary must organize collective action to
respond, presidents are likely to conclude there are few downsides to using
agencies to attack statutory programs. In the best case, administrative sabotage will go unchecked because its opponents cannot organize a response or
the president’s allies in Congress and the courts will prevent those institutions
from responding. At worst, Congress or the courts will check particular acts
of sabotage, but as the other branches scramble to respond, agencies’ action
will have immediate and perhaps irreversible effects.
*

*

*

The answer to why an agency would try to put itself out of business, then,
is that the budget-maximizing model of the bureaucracy does not account for
the actual incentives that presidents and agency leaders face in the current political environment. In an environment defined by ideologically opposed parties, partisanship, and intense opposition to federal legislation and regulation,

184. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999) (cleaned up).
185. See id. at 135.
186. See OLSON, supra note 152.
187. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
188. But cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term—Essay: The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019) (“As the Justices have interpreted it,
the Constitution allows the Court to exercise broad and sweeping appellate jurisdiction that is
not limited to review of final rulings by lower Article III and state supreme courts.”).
189. Moe & Howell, supra note 184, at 138.
190. Id. at 153–54.
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it is not inevitable that agencies will seek to expand their budgets. Often, they
will be forces of creative destruction.
III. HOW TO SABOTAGE A FEDERAL PROGRAM
I have argued so far that administrative sabotage originates in a dilemma
for presidents seeking to retrench statutory programs. Facing political and
ideological pressure to roll back programs, presidents can pursue retrenchment in Congress. But direct attacks on statutory programs are unlikely to
succeed, leaving presidents worse off than they would be had they done nothing at all. Confronted with this dilemma, presidents turn to agencies. Through
their power to direct agency action, presidents can kill or nullify statutory programs—or encourage Congress or the courts to do so—while incurring fewer
costs than they would if they engaged Congress.
But this presents still another puzzle. From the Take Care Clause to statutes and regulations governing agencies, federal law is full of checks that aim
to ensure faithful execution of the law. Given these checks, how can agencies
successfully sabotage a statutory program?
To gain traction on that question, this Part surveys the legal and institutional tools that a motivated administration can use to attack statutory programs. Drawing on case studies introduced in Part I and literatures in
administrative law, constitutional law, and positive political theory, I consider
the extent to which those tools of sabotage are checked by judicial review and
congressional oversight. 191
This survey shows, first, that presidents have access to an array of tools
for sabotaging statutory programs. In addition, the survey shows that many
tools of sabotage are effectively insulated from review by courts and Congress.
Rather than inevitably provoking an interbranch response as classical separation of powers theory predicts, many acts of sabotage will not provoke any
response from Congress or the judiciary. When sabotage is checked by the
other branches, the effectiveness of the check depends on partisan dynamics
and other contingent historical factors. The overall picture is one of sabotage
being checked inconsistently, if not randomly. Given presidents’ strong incentives to engage in sabotage, we should expect to see it continue as a regular
feature of agency policymaking, especially but not exclusively during conservative presidential administrations.
Section III.A introduces some basic distinctions among tools of administrative sabotage. Sections III.B and III.C survey the tools of administrative sabotage, beginning with systemic tools that attack institutions and procedures

191. Of course, congressional oversight and judicial review are not the only checks on
agencies. Scholars have explored checks such as public opinion, the “internal” separation of powers, and professional norms and culture. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Constraining Bureaucracy Beyond Judicial Review, DAEDALUS, Summer 2021, at 155. Although I briefly consider
some of these checks, I focus on the external constraints that are the focus of traditional separation of powers theory, leaving analysis of other checks for future work.
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through which statutory programs are administered, then turning to programmatic tools that agencies use to attack statutory programs directly.
A. Mapping Tools of Sabotage
In mapping the tools of sabotage, it is helpful to begin with some basic
distinctions. The most important is between systemic and programmatic
forms of sabotage, a distinction suggested by Paul Pierson’s classic work on
the politics of welfare reform. 192
Pierson argued that politicians seeking to scale down entitlement programs face a choice between direct and indirect strategies. “Systemic” retrenchment strategies “alter the broader political economy” of welfare politics—for
example, by lowering tax revenues or weakening the institutions that administer
welfare programs. 193 “Programmatic” strategies, by contrast, involve direct cuts
to benefits or restrictions on program eligibility. 194 Direct cuts and benefits
restrictions impose immediate costs on program beneficiaries and are likely to
mobilize intense political opposition. 195 Pierson argued that successful efforts
to retrench welfare programs would accordingly use systemic strategies. 196
A president using agencies to undermine statutory programs faces a similar choice between indirect and direct strategies. Systemic tools of sabotage
do not directly attack statutory programs but involve legal and institutional
changes that undermine the government’s ability to administer a program.
Programmatic tools, by contrast, seek to kill a program directly.
In addition to their systemic or programmatic nature, we can distinguish
among tools of sabotage based on the actors who wield them. Tools such as
appointments and executive orders are wielded by the president directly.
Other tools are wielded by agency heads or lower-level agency officials.
Finally, we can distinguish among forms of sabotage based on the likelihood that they will be checked through congressional oversight or judicial review, as well as the form that check will take.
Table 1 summarizes major tools of administrative sabotage. A check denotes that use of the tool will likely produce a strong counter-reaction from
Congress or the courts. A dash indicates the response will vary with conditions

192. See PIERSON, supra note 147.
193. Id. at 15–17.
194. Id. at 15.
195. Id. at 21.
196. See id. at 19. Professors Freeman and Jacobs highlight the same difference between
direct and indirect strategies for attacking statutory programs in their analysis of “structural deregulation.” Freeman and Jacobs define structural deregulation as presidential undermining of
administrative capacity that “targets an agency’s core capacities,” deprives it of essential resources, and diminishes it in the eyes of key stakeholders, making it more difficult for the agency
to accomplish its delegated tasks. Freeman & Jacobs, supra note 25, at 587. They distinguish
structural deregulation from “substantive” deregulation, which “aims to weaken or rescind particular agency rules or policies.” Id. at 588.
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such as partisan control of Congress. An X mark means Congress and the
courts are unlikely to check the tool.
TABLE 1: TOOLS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SABOTAGE
SYSTEMIC OR

Both

Programmatic

Systemic

PROGRAMMATIC?

CHECKS
TOOL

EXERCISED BY

Appointments

President

Nonappointments

President

Removal

President

Executive orders

Congress

Judicial
review

—

🞨🞨

🞨🞨

President

🞨🞨

—

Agency budgets

OMB, agency
heads

—

🞨🞨

Agency
organization, office
management, and
agency procedure

Agency heads

🞨🞨

🞨🞨

Metarules

Agency heads

🞨🞨

✓

Stealth science
strategies

Agency heads

🞨🞨

—

Big waiver

Agency heads

🞨🞨

—

Friendly litigation

Agency heads
and general
counsels, DOJ

🞨🞨

—

Contracting and
grantmaking

Agency heads,
lower-level
officials

🞨🞨

🞨🞨

Enforcement policy

President,
agency heads

🞨🞨

—

Rulemaking and
adjudication

Agency head,
lower-level
officials

—

✓

Misinformation

President,
agency heads,
lower-level
officials

🞨🞨

🞨🞨

🞨🞨

🞨🞨
🞨🞨
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B. Systemic Sabotage
1.

Appointments

The most powerful tool of systemic sabotage is created by the Constitution. Under the Appointments Clause, the president appoints “principal” officers of the United States. 197 This empowers the president to appoint agency
heads who oppose the programs they administer.
For example, as the Introduction noted, President Trump’s choice to lead
the CFPB tried unsuccessfully to abolish the agency as a congressman, once
describing it as a “sick, sad joke.” 198 Trump’s first appointee to head the Department of Health and Human Services was a former member of the Tea
Party Caucus who played a leading role in Republican opposition to the ACA.199
Under the Appointments Clause, the appointment of a “principal” officer
requires the Senate’s advice and consent. 200 In theory, the advice-and-consent
requirement might check the appointment of agency heads who oppose the
programs they administer. But the effectiveness of this check depends on partisan control of the Senate. When the presidency and the Senate are under
Republican control, the Senate is likely to accede to the appointment of antiregulatory agency heads, if not celebrate their appointment. 201 With the
elimination of the filibuster for executive-branch nominees, nominees can
now be confirmed with a bare majority of senators. 202
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) gives the president further
power to appoint saboteurs by providing for the appointment of “acting”
agency heads without the consent of the Senate. 203 The FVRA limits the tenure
of acting agency heads to 210 days. 204 But the statute’s complicated timing
provisions allow this period to be extended for years when one or more permanent nominations are sent to the Senate. 205 In a study of appointments
197. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
198. Glenn Thrush, Mulvaney Defends Role Running Agency He Wants to Cripple, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/us/mulvaney-defends-role-running-agency-he-wants-to-cripple.html [perma.cc/3WMZ-FUMA].
199. Amy Goldstein & Philip Rucker, Trump Names Rep. Tom Price as Next HHS Secretary, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016
/11/28/trump-to-name-rep-tom-price-as-next-hhs-secretary [perma.cc/2S4P-KYVS].
200. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
201. See, e.g., How Senators Voted on Scott Pruitt for E.P.A. Administrator, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/17/us/politics/live-congress-votesscott-pruitt-epa.html [perma.cc/TR7G-7DR7]; How Senators Voted on Tom Price for Health and
Human Services Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/10/us/politics/tom-price-confirmation-vote.html [perma.cc/QZ4S-GGZ4].
202. Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-stepsto-limit-use-of-filibuster.html [perma.cc/GQ2V-5UUT].
203. See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a).
204. Id. § 3346(a).
205. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 630–31 (2020).
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from 1981 to 2020, Anne Joseph O’Connell found that “[a]ll modern Presidents have relied heavily on acting officials” and that nearly half of all cabinet
secretaries in her sample were neither confirmed by the Senate nor appointed
during a recess. 206
Other checks on the appointment of agency saboteurs are weak or depend
on contingent historical circumstances. My research did not locate a single
case in which a court considered a claim that opposition to a statutory program disqualified an official from serving as an agency’s head. Reporting on
administrative sabotage and ethical scandals can slow the pace of sabotage and
prompt congressional investigations. 207 Yet there is no guarantee that agency
saboteurs will trigger scandals. And presidents and their appointees can be
expected to learn from past scandals in which the revelation of corruption
slowed sabotage.
Once in office, agency heads control an array of tools, detailed below, that
can be deployed to attack statutory programs. While staff buy-in is necessary
for some of these tools, agency heads can use other tools on their own. Agency
heads, moreover, can overrule their technical staff 208 and outsource work that
requires technical and legal expertise from recalcitrant bureaucrats to more
pliant contractors. 209
2.

Nonappointments

The Appointments Clause also empowers presidents to sabotage programs by failing to appoint agency heads—what might be termed “nonappointments.” Many agency functions can only be performed by the agency
head, 210 a quorum of a multimember commission, 211 or a lower-level official
designated by statute or regulation. 212 Presidents can stop an agency’s work
simply by failing to make necessary appointments. For example, after the

206. Id. at 641–43.
207. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Health Secretary Tom Price
Resigns After Drawing Ire for Chartered Flights, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/us/politics/tom-price-trump-hhs.html [perma.cc/XP5C-K6AA].
208. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2571 (2019).
209. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 749 n.120
(2010) (noting complaints that “[d]ozens of critical EPA activities have been turned over to contractors,” who were assigned to “draft rules, review public comments, prepare the final drafts . . . [,]
and provide interpretive guidance to the public once those regulations are published”). In authorizing agencies to obtain services from other agencies, the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535,
provides another mechanism through which agency heads can engage in sabotage without buyin from lower-level staff. See generally Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN.
L. REV. 886 (2012).
210. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5493(a) (authorizing CFPB director to fix the number of the Bureau’s employees and appoint and direct all employees of the Bureau).
211. See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–80 (2010) (holding that the
NLRB could not act without a statutory quorum by subdelegating its powers to Board members).
212. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Essay, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 477, 501
(2017).

790

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:753

Merit Systems Protection Board lost a quorum in 2017, President Trump did
not put forward a nominee for fourteen months.213 By failing to make a nomination, he effectively halted the Board’s enforcement of the civil service laws. 214
As Professors Freeman and Jacobs observe, agency heads can use the same
strategy to hollow out lower-level staff and replace civil servants with political
appointees. 215 During Mulvaney’s thirteen-month tenure as the CFPB’s acting
director, the Bureau lost at least 129 of its 1,600 employees. 216 In 2020, the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) employed only 761
inspectors—an “all-time low” for the agency. 217
Apart from calling attention to nonappointments, there is little that actors
outside the White House can do to counter them. The Senate’s power of advice and consent creates a natural inertia against the confirmation of agency
heads. In the courts, separation of powers doctrine provides nonstatutory
remedies for parties who suffer a legal injury at the hands of an “unconstitutionally structured” agency. 218 But in a striking example of administrative law’s bias
toward protecting negative liberty, no such remedies are available for parties
who are injured by the failure to constitute a lawfully created agency in the
first place. Under Article III standing doctrine, courts would likely view such

213. Compare Katz, supra note 37 (indicating that the Merit Systems Protection board
lacked a quorum starting in January 2017), with Press Release, White House, Eleven Nominations Sent to the Senate Today (Mar. 12, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/eleven-nominations-sent-senate-today-2 [perma.cc/YY89-HT6T] (indicating that
Dennis Kirk and Andrew Maunz were nominated to serve on the Merit Systems Protection
Board on March 12, 2018), and Press Release, White House, Seven Nominations Sent to the
Senate Today (June 20, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/sevennominations-sent-senate-today-3 [perma.cc/MZ7P-XEE4] (indicating that Julia Clark was nominated to serve on the Merit Systems Protection Board on June 20, 2018).
214. Systematic analysis of appointment patterns confirms that presidents use nonappointments strategically. Christina M. Kinane found that in the period prior to the 1998 enactment of the FVRA, presidents were less likely to fill positions when they prioritize contracting
policies an agency administers. Conversely, presidents were more likely to fill positions with
interim appointees when they prioritized a policy area. Christina M. Kinane, Control Without
Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
599, 599–600, 612 (2021).
215. See Freeman & Jacobs, supra note 25, at 595–600.
216. Robert O’Harrow Jr., Shawn Boburg & Renae Merle, How Trump Appointees Curbed
a Consumer Protection Agency Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-trump-appointees-curbed-a-consumer-protectionagency-loathed-by-the-gop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-de20-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html
[perma.cc/WH3M-97GN].
217. Freeman & Jacobs, supra note 25, at 596; cf. Adam M. Finkel, A Healthy Public Cannot
Abide Unhealthy and Unsafe Workplaces, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 312 (2018) (indicating that
OSHA had about two thousand inspectors in 2018).
218. David Zaring, Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 708, 728
(2020); see Elizabeth Earle Beske, Litigating the Separation of Powers, 73 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3792936 [perma.cc/U33V-HTZJ].

March 2022]

Administrative Sabotage

791

a claim as a “ ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens” that does not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. 219
3.

Removal

Presidents’ powers of appointment and nonappointment work hand in
hand with their power to remove agency officials. 220 When an agency is led by
an official who is faithfully executing the agency’s statutory mandate, the president can dismiss her or force her from office. 221 Having done so, the president
is free to install an agency head who opposes the agency’s mission or to leave
the agency headless.
Although the president’s removal power is undoubtedly broad, its precise
scope is contested. Congress has attempted to protect certain agency heads by
limiting the grounds upon which they may be removed, but conservative justices are engaged in a long-term project to dismantle those protections.
A major recent development in this project came in Seila Law v. CFPB,
which involved a provision of the Consumer Financial Protection Act. The
provision specified that the CFPB director could be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 222 In an opinion for five justices, Chief Justice Roberts framed the question as whether “[o]ur precedents”
allowed Congress to require that the director of a single-headed agency (that
is, one led by a single executive rather than a board) only be removed for
cause. 223 Removal protections are commonplace in “independent” regulatory
commissions, 224 and since 1996, the Social Security Act has provided that the
commissioner of the Social Security Administration may be removed only
“pursuant to a finding by the President of neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office.” 225 However, the Court read Myers v. United States 226 to establish that

219. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
220. See Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020).
221. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Josh Dawsey, Postmaster General Who Was Target of Trump’s
Ire Announces Retirement, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/postmaster-general-who-was-target-of-trumps-ire-announces-retirement/2019/10/16
/608e6286-c51d-11e9-850e-c0eef81a5224_story.html [perma.cc/43AU-CR9G]; Rosalind S. Helderman & Matea Gold, Federal Ethics Chief Who Clashed with White House Announces He Will
Step Down, WASH. POST (July 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-ethics-chief-who-clashed-with-white-house-announces-he-will-step-down/2017/07/06/4732c308624c-11e7-a4f7-af34fc1d9d39_story.html [perma.cc/FA35-6YDZ].
222. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3).
223. Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
224. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 786 (2013).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3).
226. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). A paean to executive power written by Chief Justice (and former
President) Taft, Myers held that the Congress could not prevent the president from removing a
postmaster. In a lengthy historical analysis, Taft purported to demonstrate that the Constitution
impliedly authorizes the president to remove all “executive officers of the United States whom
he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
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Article II vests the president with “authority to remove those who assist him
in carrying out his duties.”227 Because the CFPB was led by a single director,
not a multimember board, “our precedents” did not allow Congress to protect
the director from removal. Accordingly, the Court declared the offending provision of the Consumer Financial Protection Act void. 228
Some commentators suggest that Seila Law’s overall effect is neutral: proregulatory presidents will use their removal power to fire antiregulatory
agency heads, and antiregulatory presidents will use theirs to fire proregulatory
agency heads. 229 Thus, the decision gives with one hand while it takes with the
other.
But this analysis ignores the asymmetrical nature of statutory removal
protections. Under the typical statutory language, mere policy disagreement
is not “cause” for removing an agency head, but faithless execution of the law
is. 230 Administrative sabotage is the paradigm case of faithless execution of the
law. Thus, the long-term effect of invalidating statutory removal protections
is to favor administrative sabotage. When removal protections are enforceable, they protect agency heads who are engaged in good-faith policy implementation while allowing saboteurs to be fired for cause. Seila Law upends
this arrangement.
Apart from judicial enforcement of statutory removal protections, checks
on the removal power are weak. While presidents are prolific users of the removal
power, 231 it is rare for firings to lead to congressional investigations.232 When

Myers’s historiography is disputed by many historians. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1964 n.135 (2011).
227. Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010)).
228. Id. at 2211. In Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021), the Court extended Seila Law
to agencies that are not engaged primarily in law enforcement, holding that the president could
remove the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) notwithstanding a provision of the Economic Recovery Act of 2008 that provided the director could only be removed
for cause. Pub. L. No. 110-289, sec. 1101, § 1312(b)(2), 122 Stat. 2654, 2662 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 4512(b)(2)).
229. See, e.g., Sitaraman, supra note 18, at 355; Richard Cordray, Opinion, Why the CFPB’s
Loss at the Supreme Court Is Really a Win, WASH. POST (June 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/why-cfpbs-loss-supreme-court-is-really-win [perma.cc/4MYQ2G8T].
230. For an exhaustive historical analysis, see Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three
Permissions: Presidential Removal and the Statutory Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 67 (2021).
231. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Biden Team Rushes to Take Over Government, and Oust
Trump Loyalists, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/us/politics/biden-government.html [perma.cc/K9UZ-LKPA]; Jan Diehm, Sam Petulla & Zachary B.
Wolf, Who Has Left Trump’s Administration and Orbit?, CNN (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www
.cnn.com/interactive/2017/08/politics/trump-admin-departures-trnd [perma.cc/ZCU4-H2Y9].
232. Among recent examples, Congress has investigated President Trump’s firing of FBI
director James Comey, President Obama’s 2009 firing of AmeriCorps’s inspector general, and
George W. Bush’s midterm firing of seven United States attorneys.
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it comes to more powerful checks, Congress is missing in action. The last president to face censure or impeachment over a removal was Andrew Johnson. 233
4.

Executive Orders

While changes to agency leadership might put the gears of sabotage in
motion, agencies may need a nudge to overcome inertia or coordinate their
work with other agencies. Presidents have discovered that executive orders are
a powerful tool for addressing these problems.
In his first official act as president, Trump ordered “the heads of all other
executive departments and agencies” to “exercise all authority and discretion
available to them to waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the implementation” of the ACA. 234 Executive Order 13,772 directed agencies to “restore public accountability within Federal financial regulatory agencies and
rationalize the Federal financial regulatory framework”—a reference to longstanding conservative complaints about Dodd-Frank. 235 And Executive Order
13,771 imposed a government-wide “regulatory budget” and purported to require agencies to rescind two regulations before issuing a new one. 236
Presidents’ position at the head of the executive branch allows them to
issue executive orders quickly, easily, and without advance notice. 237 The volume of executive orders, as well as partisan dynamics in Congress, makes congressional scrutiny of any given executive order unlikely. 238 In Franklin v.
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that the president is not an “agency”
under the APA. 239 Thus, when an executive order merely charges agencies
233. See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 112–13 (2017).
234. Exec. Order No. 13,765, 3 C.F.R. 260 (2017).
235. Exec. Order No. 13,772, 3 C.F.R. 286 (2017); see Sitaraman, supra note 18, at 365–66
(describing efforts by Republican senators and business allies to portray the CFPB as an authoritarian Soviet-style agency).
236. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 3 C.F.R. 284 (2017).
237. As a legal matter, the president may issue an executive order simply by publishing it
in the Federal Register. 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)(1). The process of issuing an executive order is formally governed by a Kennedy-era order that calls for extensive interagency collaboration and
lawyering before an executive order issues. Exec. Order No. 11,030, 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959–1963).
The Trump administration simply ignored this process in some of its most important executive
actions. See, e.g., Kim Soffen & Darla Cameron, How Trump’s Travel Ban Broke from the Normal
Executive Order Process, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/politics/trump-travel-ban-process [perma.cc/KQT8-ZYBM].
238. See Moe & Howell, supra note 184, at 165 (finding, based on a list of all congressional
responses to executive orders during the period 1973–1997, that “Congress rarely even attempts
to respond to executive orders”). In a solo project, Howell catalogued all the bills introduced in
Congress between 1945 and 1998 that “sought to amend, extend, overturn, or codify in law a
particular executive order.” WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS
OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 113 (2003). In the period after 1972, “less than 3 percent of
the executive orders issued by presidents received any measure of critical attention by Congress.”
Id. at 113, 116.
239. 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
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with carrying out a presidential policy, judicial review is generally unavailable
until the order is implemented in final agency action, preventing judicial review from being a major check on executive policymaking. 240
5.

Budgeting and Spending

The White House’s role in agency budgeting and spending gives presidents further opportunities to attack statutory programs. The president’s
power over the budget traces to the Budget and Accounting Act, which
charges OMB with proposing an annual budget to Congress and overseeing
the implementation of appropriations legislation. 241 As Eloise Pasachoff describes, OMB’s resource-management offices are pervasively involved in
agency budgeting decisions. 242 This allows the White House to both bolster
and undermine statutory programs.
For example, in 2017 OMB proposed “deep cuts to the Environmental
Protection Agency’s budget that would reduce the agency’s staff by one-fifth
in the first year and eliminate dozens of programs.” 243 Congress essentially
ignored the administration’s budget proposal, enacting a budget that increased the agency’s funding by approximately 9 percent. 244 But the administration used the appropriation to fund buyouts that hollowed out the
agency’s scientific staff. In September 2018, the Washington Post reported that
generous retirement packages contributed to an exodus of nearly 1,600 employees from the agency, among them the agencies’ most senior scientific personnel. 245
The president can also shift money from disfavored programs to programs he supports. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security diverted
nearly $10 million from the Federal Emergency Management Authority to
240. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”); see also
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constraining the Statutory President, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 79–82 (2020)
(reviewing D.C. Circuit caselaw applying Franklin); HOWELL, supra note 238, at 154 (finding in
a database of eighty-three cases challenging executive orders that courts affirmed the president’s
order 83 percent of the time).
241. See Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, ch. 18, § 201(a), 42 Stat. 20, 20 (current version
at 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)).
242. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125
YALE L.J. 2182, 2199–2200 (2016).
243. Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, White House Eyes Plan to Cut EPA Staff by One-Fifth,
Eliminating Key Programs, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/01/white-house-proposes-cutting-epa-staff-by-one-fiftheliminating-key-programs [perma.cc/6LCK-PPXH].
244. See EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget
[perma.cc/6UY9-W56P].
245. Brady Dennis, Juliet Eilperin & Andrew Ba Tran, With a Shrinking EPA, Trump Delivers on His Promise to Cut Government, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/with-a-shrinking-epa-trump-delivers-on-his-promise-to-cutgovernment/2018/09/08/6b058f9e-b143-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html [perma.cc/8GPU8QB5].
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement to pay for detention programs. 246
The small portion of Trump’s border wall that was completed during his presidency was funded from unrelated programs in the Department of Defense’s
budget. 247 Although one court of appeals ruled that the transfers violated the
Appropriations Clause and another hinted that it agreed, the Supreme Court
stayed injunctions stopping the transfers because of doubts over private parties’ authority to sue. 248
Agency heads with independent budget authority can use it to attack statutory programs. 249 In January 2018, Mulvaney requested nothing from the
Federal Reserve to fund the CFPB’s operations. 250 In July 2020, Mulvaney and
a protégé urged Kathy Kraninger, Mulvaney’s replacement as CFPB director,
to stop drawing funds from the Federal Reserve until Congress altered the Bureau’s structure—effectively holding the Bureau hostage to force changes to
its authorizing legislation. 251
Under the Constitution, “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury”
except as authorized by Congress. 252 To some extent, Congress’s power of the
purse and authority to set overall funding for the government through appropriations bills operates as a check on budgetary sabotage. But Congress’s control over agency budgets diminishes once funds have been appropriated. An
example is provided by the 2019 Ukraine scandal. Congress appropriated
funds to support Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression, but OMB
withheld the funds as part of a White House–directed pressure campaign to

246. Isaac Stanley-Becker, Trump Administration Diverted Nearly $10 Million from
FEMA to ICE Detention Program, According to DHS Document, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/09/12/document-shows-the-trumpadministration-diverted-nearly-10-million-from-fema-to-ice-detention-program [perma.cc/G327EJQC].
247. Trump’s Border Wall Hits a Wall as Pentagon Cancels Parts Funded from Its Budget,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2021, 5:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/apr/30/trumpwall-pentagon-cancels-parts-funded-military-budget [perma.cc/JE2N-GLEG].
248. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 676 (9th Cir.) (concluding that the reallocation
of Department of Defense funds for border-wall construction is a violation of the Appropriations Clause), rev’d on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (holding that plaintiffs lacked a cause
of action to challenge reallocation of funds); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d
1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
249. “Independent” budget authority refers to various mechanisms through which agencies are funded outside of the OMB-managed budget process. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS (2020), https://www.cbpp.org
/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-7-03bud.pdf [perma.cc/AJQ7-845H].
250. Letter from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., CFPB, to Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fy2018_q2_funding-request-letter-to-frb.pdf [perma.cc/H6KC-A8HX].
251. Mick Mulvaney & Eric Blankenstein, Opinion, The Justices’ Wakeup Call to Congress,
WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-justices-wakeup-call-tocongress-11594767475 [perma.cc/LF8E-M9LZ].
252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl 7. See generally CHAFETZ, supra note 233, at 45–77.
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force the Ukrainian government to announce an investigation of Joe Biden. 253
A Government Accountability Office report concluded that OMB’s actions
violated the 2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act and the Impoundment Control Act, a Nixon-era measure that seeks to prevent the president from failing to spend appropriated money. 254 Yet OMB’s failure to spend
the funds only was revealed by the filing of an extraordinary whistleblower
complaint that the Trump administration unsuccessfully attempted to suppress. 255 Were it not for that complaint and the ensuing political scandal,
OMB’s failure to transfer the funds to Ukraine would likely have escaped all
congressional scrutiny.
Nor are agency spending decisions subject to regular judicial review. In
Lincoln v. Vigil, the Supreme Court ruled that the allocation of a lump-sum
appropriation is a matter “committed to agency discretion” under the APA. 256
6.

Agency Organization, Office Management, and Agency Procedure

Legislation “may stipulate some basic details of agency structure, such as
specific divisions or departments and requirements for key agency personnel.” 257 But agency heads resolve many other matters, from the organization
of particular offices to who reports to whom. 258 These choices provide further
opportunities for administrative sabotage.
For example, Mulvaney eliminated CFPB enforcement attorneys’ power
to issue civil investigative demands 259 and moved the Office of Fair Lending
and Equal Opportunity out of the CFPB’s enforcement division. 260 Wearing
his hat as OMB director, Mulvaney later boasted to a group of donors that he
253. Office of Management and Budget—Withholding of Ukraine Security Assistance, B331564, 2020 WL 241373, at 1 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 16, 2020).
254. Id.; see also ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 18–19
(3d ed. 2007).
255. See Zachary B. Wolf & Curt Merrill, The Whistleblower Complaint, Annotated, CNN
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/09/politics/whistleblower-complaintannotated [perma.cc/6E3B-QD3Q]; Ellen Nakashima, Whistleblower Sought Informal Guidance
from Schiff’s Committee Before Filing Complaint Against Trump, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/whistleblower-sought-informal-guidancefrom-schiffs-committee-before-filing-complaint-against-trump/2019/10/02/e5124b8a-e543-11e9a6e8-8759c5c7f608_story.html [perma.cc/69CY-F4AN] (describing the Office of Legal Counsel’s
conclusion that the complaint was not an “urgent concern” under the Intelligence Community
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H(i)(1)).
256. 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
257. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV.
1239, 1253 (2017) (footnote omitted).
258. See id.
259. See Jean Veta, Jason Grimes & Eitan Levisohn, Potential Revamp of CFPB Civil Investigative Demand Process, LAW360 (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/1007257/potential-revamp-of-cfpb-civil-investigative-demand-process [perma.cc/8VUP-FKLA].
260. Kate Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney Strips His Fair-Lending Office of Enforcement Powers,
AM. BANKER (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:43 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-mulvaneystrips-his-fair-lending-office-of-enforcement-powers [perma.cc/V3Q7-BQAJ].
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had forced a wave of retirements by moving a Department of Agriculture office from Washington, D.C., to Kansas City. 261
Given the size and complexity of the administrative state, Congress cannot hope to monitor all the decisions agency heads make concerning internal
agency organization and procedure. 262 Nor are those decisions likely to be
checked through judicial review. The APA exempts “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” from the ordinary notice-and-comment process. 263 Apart from this bar, there are serious obstacles to challenging
organizational and procedural changes in court. While such changes occasionally give rise to justiciable injuries, 264 many cases fail. 265
7.

Metarules

One form of agency procedure—what might be termed “metarules”—deserves special mention. These rules leverage the “Accardi principle,” which requires agencies to follow their own regulations until they are properly
modified or rescinded. 266 By establishing rules for the agency’s own rulemaking process, metarules may weaken or eliminate an agency’s ability to carry
out statutory mandates.

261. Eric Katz, Mulvaney: Relocating Offices Is a ‘Wonderful Way’ to Shed Federal Employees, GOV. EXEC. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2019/08/mulvaney-relocating-offices-wonderful-way-shed-federal-employees/158932 [perma.cc/P544-ABRE]; see also
Freeman & Jacobs, supra note 25, at 598–99 (“A similar relocation effort by the Department of
the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management prompted more than eighty-seven percent of employees asked to move from Washington, D.C., to Grand Junction, Colorado to resign or retire . . . .”). Like other tools of sabotage, office moves can be used for legitimate purposes.
Compare David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L. REV. 727 (2018) (arguing for federal decentralization as a means of diffusing power), with David Fontana, Destructive Federal
Decentralization, 29 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619 (2021) (examining the Trump administration’s relocation of federal officials outside of Washington, D.C., to reduce the federal government’s capacity).
262. Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 25–26 (2011).
263. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). In addition, matters “related solely to the internal personnel
rules or practices of an agency” are “exempted from disclosure” under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
264. See Lodge 1858, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(concluding that NASA’s authorizing legislation intended to protect “425 of the many thousands
of NASA jobs from” private-sector competition and that employees had standing to challenge
demotions and discharges connected to a reduction in force).
265. See Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991) (holding that injury to Postal Service employees’ employment prospects caused by liberalization of
international courier rules did not give employees standing to challenge changes to the rules);
Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that Army’s
decision to “contract out” services formerly provided by government employees of the Directorate of Logistics was not subject to judicial review).
266. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 569 (2006).
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The EPA’s “Science Transparency” rule, for example, would have prohibited the agency from relying on scientific studies when the underlying scientific data was not made available to the public. 267 The agency presented the
rule as a commonsense effort to improve the reliability of air-quality regulations. 268 But as the editors of the nation’s leading scientific journals explained,
it would have prohibited the agency from relying on gold-standard epidemiological studies that measured the effects of air pollution using private medical
records that could not lawfully be disclosed to the public. 269
Another metarule proposed by the EPA would have required cost-benefit
analyses prepared by the agency to focus on direct, monetizable benefits of
regulation, limiting the agency’s ability to consider indirect benefits that justify air-quality regulations. 270 Meanwhile, the Department of Energy’s Process
Rule would have prohibited the department from promulgating energy-efficiency standards for furnaces, water heaters, and boilers. 271
Metarules represent “final” agency action and are subject to review under
the APA. Because of legal and analytical errors, courts vacated many Trumpera metarules. For instance, following the change in administrations, in February 2021 a district court vacated the Science Transparency rule because the
agency failed to follow notice-and-comment procedures. 272 In April 2021, the
D.C. Circuit vacated the EPA’s Significant Contribution rule based on a concession by the agency’s new leadership that the rule was arbitrary. 273
Congress, however, is unlikely to respond to agencies’ promulgation of
metarules for much the same reasons that it is unlikely to respond to changes
in agency organization and procedure. The rules merely change the way agencies carry out their functions and thus do not provide a focal point that galvanizes congressional action. And the volume of potential metarules gives
agencies the advantage over Congress in battles over the way that agencies do

267. Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory
Actions and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 30).
268. See Press Release, EPA, EPA Finalizes Rule Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal
Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions and Influential Scientific Information (Jan.
5, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-rule-strengthening-transparency-pivotal-science-underlying-significant [perma.cc/9A6V-F6N4].
269. See H. Holden Thorp et al., Joint Statement on EPA Proposed Rule and Public Availability of Data, SCIENCE (Dec. 6, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba3197.
270. See Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Benefits and Costs in
the Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process, 85 Fed. Reg. 84,130 (Dec. 23, 2020) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 83).
271. Lauren Urbanek, New DOE Policy Kneecaps Energy Efficiency Standards, NAT. RES.
DEF. COUNCIL (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/lauren-urbanek/new-doe-policykneecaps-energy-efficiency-standards [perma.cc/PJP5-XCAX].
272. Env’t Def. Fund v. EPA, 515 F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1148–51 (D. Mont. 2021).
273. California v. EPA, No. 21-1035, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 10426 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5, 2021);
Melissa Horne, Mack McGuffy & Emily Guillaume, Rule Limiting EPA Regulation of GHG Emissions Vacated by D.C. Circuit, JD SUPRA (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/rule-limiting-epa-regulation-of-ghg-4318191 [perma.cc/8W2Y-6L8T].
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business. Notably, the 117th Congress did not repeal a single Trump-era metarule through the Congressional Review Act, despite Democrats’ unified control of Congress and the presidency and the availability of an expedited,
filibuster-proof legislative process under the Act. 274
8.

Stealth Science

The difficulty of basing legislation on timely, high-quality scientific information and agencies’ comparatively greater access to such information are
classic rationales for Congress to delegate regulatory authority to agencies. 275
Administrative law seeks to ensure that agencies use science responsibly, for
example by requiring that agencies disclose certain data and analyses. 276 But
agencies retain significant discretion over how scientific information is created and interpreted—a power that can be used to attack statutory programs.
Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner document ten specific techniques
that federal environmental agencies have used to undermine the programs
they administer. 277 They include censoring agency scientists, 278 limiting opportunities for scientific input, 279 tweaking model inputs and assumptions, 280
rewriting scientific reports that might prompt calls for rulemaking, 281 and manipulating the rules for scientific deliberation by disbanding or reconstituting
advisory panels. 282
These strategies overlap with other forms of sabotage, and their susceptibility to judicial review depends on the specific form of policymaking that an
agency uses to manipulate the scientific process. But stealth science is unlikely
to be checked through congressional oversight. After all, Congress’s perceived

274. Congressional Review Act Tracker, GEO. WASH. UNIV. REGUL. STUD. CTR., https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/congressional-review-act [perma.cc/7D9K-3A7L]; DANIEL R.
PÉREZ, GEO. WASH. UNIV. REGUL. STUD. CTR., CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT FACT SHEET 1–2
(2019), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs3306/f/downloads/Insights/GW%20Reg%20Studies%20-%20CRA%20Factsheet%20-%20DPerez_12.9.19.pdf [perma.cc
/DC45-ZJK6].
275. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 23, at 48.
276. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
277. Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Deregulation Using Stealth “Science”
Strategies, 68 DUKE L.J. 1719 (2019).
278. Id. at 1724–28 (discussing “policy reviews” of climate-change studies by the U.S. Geological Service and the EPA’s delay of a report finding that formaldehyde caused leukemia).
279. Id. at 1727–29 (discussing efforts by the George W. Bush administration to limit advice of independent scientific bodies on climate change).
280. Id. at 1728–33 (discussing an EPA proposal to allow private parties to submit riskassessment models that the agency was required to evaluate).
281. Id. at 1740–42 (discussing an EPA report edited by political appointees to state that
fracking did not have “widespread systemic” impacts on drinking water).
282. Id. at 1758 (discussing the EPA’s disbanding of two advisory committees that the
agency had used for thirty years to assist in the formulation of particulate-matter regulations).
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inability to base regulation on scientific and technical information is often the
reason it delegates in the first place.
C. Programmatic Sabotage
Tools of systemic sabotage change institutional and legal conditions in
ways that undermine statutory programs. The indirect nature of these tools
obscures their effects on statutory policy, making them less likely to provoke
a response from Congress, the courts, and the public. Thus, as Pierson’s work
suggests, systemic sabotage is more likely to succeed in retrenching statutory
programs. 283
Yet the same indirectness that insulates those tools from checks means
that they take time to work. Presidents who are in a hurry to dismantle a statutory program can use another set of programmatic tools. Some of these tools
can also be used for systemic sabotage. But in contrast to the tools of systemic
sabotage, they aim to directly kill or nullify a statutory program.
1.

Rulemaking and Adjudication

The most basic tools of programmatic sabotage are the staples of agency
regulation under the APA: rulemaking and adjudication. In hundreds of statutes, Congress has authorized agencies to develop subsidiary statutory policy
that carries the force of law. 284 The broad language of these delegations allows
agencies to make policy decisions that kill or nullify statutory programs.
For example, an August 2018 regulation issued in part by the Department
of the Treasury eliminated restrictions on the sale of short-term health-insurance plans, paving the way for the sale of “junk” insurance plans that the ACA
sought to exclude from the insurance marketplace. 285 In July 2020, the CFPB
issued a revision of its payday lending rule that gave the Bureau’s imprimatur
to high-interest loans that force borrowers into “debt traps”—one of the problems that prompted Congress to enact the Consumer Financial Protection Act
in 2010. 286

283. See PIERSON, supra note 147, at 15–17. Activists seeking to undermine federal legislation and regulation share the sentiment. Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is
Changing the Federal Bureaucracy, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/how-the-trump-era-is-changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa711e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html [perma.cc/R4B4-6TN7] (quoting a statement by Grover
Norquist that “slow and steady” approaches are “how you downsize government without engendering blowback”).
284. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 23, at 114–16.
285. Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,212 (Aug. 3, 2018) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54); see also Bagley & Gluck, supra note 40.
286. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg.
44,382 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041); SUSANNA MONTEZEMOLO, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LENDING ABUSES AND PREDATORY PRACTICES 18 (2013),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/10-Payday-Loans.pdf [perma.cc
/J9E9-EV5V].
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Of all the tools of administrative sabotage, rulemaking and adjudication
are subject to the strongest external checks. Scholars have found that members
of Congress keep tabs on major rulemakings and even participate in them. 287
Adjudication and rulemaking produce final agency action that is subject to
judicial review under the APA, 288 and empirical analyses of regulatory rollback suggests that such review is a substantial check on agency deregulation. 289 So why would agencies use rulemaking and adjudication for sabotage
when more insulated tools are available?
First, it is not inevitable that all uses of rulemaking and adjudication for
sabotage will provoke a reaction from Congress and the courts. Interest
groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others regularly seek judicial review of agencies’ actions. 290 But to do so, a challenger must monitor the
agency’s regulatory docket, participate in agency proceedings, locate a suitable
petitioner or plaintiff (or demonstrate organizational standing), and file and
brief a case. 291 In Steve Bannon’s phrase, an agency can “flood the zone with
shit” in the hope that some regulations will avoid review. 292
The second reason involves the effect of successful rulemaking and adjudication. Features of administrative law from the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard 293 to the Accardi rule 294 make it difficult for agencies to change policy
that is established through relatively formal administrative procedures. Thus,
rulemaking (and to a lesser extent adjudication) allow agencies to establish
“sticky regulations” that later administrations can change only if they are willing to incur substantial costs. 295

287. See Kenneth Lowande & Rachel Augustine Potter, Congressional Oversight Revisited:
Politics and Procedure in Agency Rulemaking, 83 J. POL. 401 (2021) (documenting ways that
members of Congress participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking).
288. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 61–62 (2004).
289. See Bethany A. Davis Noll, “Tired of Winning”: Judicial Review of Regulatory Policy in
the Trump Era, 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 366–68 (2021).
290. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, N.Y.U. SCH. OF L.: INST. FOR
POL’Y INTEGRITY (Apr. 1, 2021), https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup [perma.cc
/3ZNT-YHGH].
291. See Bethany Davis Noll, Trump’s Regulatory ‘Whack-a-Mole,’ POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2019,
5:13 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/04/10/trump-federal-regulations-000890
[perma.cc/PK6P-ZFLP].
292. See Michael Lewis, Opinion, Has Anyone Seen the President?, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21,
2018, 10:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-09/has-anyone-seenthe-president [perma.cc/7FM2-4EL8] (“The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal
with them is to flood the zone with shit.”).
293. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
294. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954).
295. See Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 96–100 (2018);
Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, supra note 290 (finding that challengers prevailed in approximately 80 percent of challenges to the Trump administration’s efforts to change
administrative policies through agency action); cf. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L.
REV. 135, 169 (2010) (finding that “agencies win between 60 and 70% of their appeals with few
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Using rulemaking and adjudication for sabotage is thus a gamble for
agencies. Compared to other tools of sabotage, Congress and the courts are
more likely to check rulemaking and adjudication. But those tools also offer
presidents the prospect of lasting damage to statutory programs.
2.

Big Waiver

A closely related tool is what Judge David Barron and Todd Rakoff term
“big waiver.” 296 Congress increasingly has “give[n] agencies the broad, discretionary power to determine whether the rule or rules that Congress has established should be dispensed with.” 297 As Jed Steiglitz has noted, such big-waiver
provisions give rise to information problems that allow states to undermine
federal safety-net programs. 298 They also invite direct attacks on programs by
the federal agencies that exercise waiver authority. 299
Consider how the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
used waivers to promote Medicaid work requirements. Medicaid’s “primary
purpose” is “to enable states to provide medical services to those whose ‘income
and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.’ ” 300 During the Trump administration, HHS nonetheless encouraged
states to apply for waivers authorizing them to limit Medicaid eligibility to
individuals who were employed or actively seeking work. 301 Such work requirements would transform Medicaid from a program that aims to expand health
access into a form of government-subsidized health insurance for the working
poor. 302 The proposed change was explicitly premised on disagreement with
Congress’s decision to expand Medicaid eligibility in the ACA. In a letter inviting states to apply for waivers, the heads of HHS and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) described the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
as “a clear departure from the core, historical mission of the program.” 303
exceptions”). As Melissa Wasserman argues, these findings are biased by “deference asymmetries”
that favor regulated entities in judicial review of agency action. See Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625 (2015).
296. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
265 (2013).
297. Id. at 267 (emphasis omitted).
298. Edward H. Stiglitz, Forces of Federalism, Safety Nets, and Waivers, 18 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 125 (2017).
299. See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver Under Statutory Sabotage, 45 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 213 (2019).
300. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 100 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am.
v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2001)), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 890 (2020).
301. See Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., & Seema
Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., to U.S. Governors (Mar. 14, 2017)
[hereinafter Price Letter], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf
[perma.cc/YAA3-WAUU].
302. See Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 788 (2018).
303. Price Letter, supra note 301, at 1.

March 2022]

Administrative Sabotage

803

Because of collective action and coordination problems, Congress is unlikely to check the use of big-wavier authority for sabotage. Indeed, the structure of big-waiver provisions exacerbates Congress’s institutional
disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive by lowering the barriers to executive nullification of statutory requirements.
Recognizing this risk, many statutes require agencies to follow specified
procedures when granting waivers and subject waiver decisions to judicial review. 304 In Gresham v. Azar, the D.C. Circuit concluded that HHS’s approval
of Arkansas’s work requirement was arbitrary and capricious because the department failed to account for the waiver’s negative effect on health coverage. 305 But just as some regulations and orders will escape judicial review, so
will some waivers. 306 And the standards for assessing the lawfulness of a waiver
may allow for waivers that kill or nullify statutory programs. The challenge to
Arkansas’s waiver succeeded only because the Medicaid Act requires HHS to
find that a waiver was “likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of Medicaid—a requirement that an access-restricting work requirement could not
satisfy. 307 If HHS operated under a waiver provision that was worded differently, Medicaid work requirements might well have withstood judicial review. 308
3.

Friendly Litigation

When agencies do not proceed through rulemaking and adjudication, they
still have many tools of programmatic sabotage available. One might be termed
friendly litigation. Rather than defend statutory programs from legal attacks,
agencies might concede error—or affirmatively support the challengers.
A striking recent example occurred in Texas v. United States. 309 In February 2018, a coalition of nineteen states and Governor Paul LePage of Maine
filed suit against the federal government in the Northern District of Texas,
seeking a declaration that the ACA was invalid in its entirety. 310 The states’
argument exploited the 2017 tax bill’s elimination of the tax penalty for failing

304. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 298, at 147 (discussing the Medicaid Act’s review provisions).
305. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 102.
306. See supra text accompanying note 291.
307. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).
308. Related to big waiver is the phenomenon of “unrules,” or “decisions that regulators
make to lift or limit the scope of a regulatory obligation through, for instance, waivers, exemptions, or exceptions.” Cary Coglianese, Gabriel Scheffler & Daniel E. Walters, Unrules, 73 STAN.
L. REV. 885, 885 (2021). Based on a text analysis of the Federal Register, Coglianese, Scheffler,
and Walters find that unrules are “pervasive.” Id. at 893.
309. 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
310. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 591 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part, 945
F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
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to comply with the ACA’s individual insurance mandate. 311 In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court concluded that the ACA’s individual insurance mandate was a valid exercise of Congress’s tax power. 312 Plaintiffs contended that
because the tax bill zeroed out the penalty for violating the mandate, the mandate could no longer be upheld as an exercise of the tax power. 313 But plaintiffs
didn’t stop there. Adopting the reasoning of the NFIB dissent, they contended
that the individual mandate could not be severed from the remainder of the
ACA and asked the court to declare the entire law void. 314
In the district court, the government declined to defend the individual
mandate but argued that all but two provisions of the ACA could be severed
from it. 315 The district court adopted the plaintiffs’ argument and invalidated
the entire ACA but stayed its ruling pending appeal. 316 At that point, the government changed positions and urged the Fifth Circuit to declare that the
ACA could not be enforced in the eighteen plaintiffs’ states. 317 The Fifth Circuit largely followed the district court’s analysis but remanded for further
analysis of the appropriate remedy, following which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 318 In the Supreme Court, the government continued to argue that the entire ACA was invalid. 319 Only after President Biden took office
did the government return to its original view that the individual mandate
could be severed from the remainder of the ACA. 320 The Supreme Court
found that the case did not present a justiciable controversy, reversed the Fifth
Circuit’s judgment with respect to standing, and directed that the case be dismissed. 321 As commentators noted, the government’s litigating positions in
Texas transparently sought the very repeal of the ACA that the GOP tried and
failed to secure in the 115th Congress. 322

311. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2092
(codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(A)) (eliminating the ACA’s shared-responsibility payment).
312. 567 U.S. 519, 547–57 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
313. Texas, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
314. Id.
315. Fed. Defendants’ Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction at 16, Texas, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (No. 18-cv-167).
316. Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665, 665–66 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part,
945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
317. See Brief for the Fed. Defendants at 49, Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir.
2019) (No. 19-10011).
318. See Texas, 945 F.3d at 403, rev’d sub nom. California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).
319. Brief for the Fed. Respondents at 36, California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021) (No.
19-840) (“The individual mandate is not severable from the rest of the Act.”).
320. Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solic. Gen, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk, Sup.
Ct. of the U.S. (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-840/168649
/20210210151147983_19-840%2019-1019%20CA%20v%20TX.pdf [perma.cc/GT3L-D3LR].
321. California, 141 S. Ct. at 2113, 2120.
322. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, A Case That Should Have Been Laughed Out of Court May
Kill Obamacare, ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12
/affordable-care-acts-unconstitutional-flaw/603871 [perma.cc/W75N-YZUE]; Maggie Haberman
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Texas underscores the seriousness of the threat to statutory programs that
friendly litigation poses. The success of the conservative legal movement ensures an endless stream of creative arguments against federal legislation and
regulation and a bench that is receptive to those arguments. Venue rules allow
plaintiffs to handpick the court—and in some cases, the judge—that will hear
constitutional and statutory challenges to agency-administered programs. 323
And the broad scope of federal courts’ remedial authority effectively allows
district judges to dictate whether statutory programs continue in effect. 324
Congress’s main response so far has been to authorize houses of Congress
to defend programs that the Justice Department refuses to defend. 325 But this
leaves much to be desired. Congressional defenses of statutory programs depend on divided government. And the House and Senate lack the Justice Department’s resources, expertise, and prestige.
4.

Enforcement Policy

Traditionally, criminal prosecutors and administrative agencies were
thought to possess virtually unchecked discretion in choosing which cases to
pursue. The classic statement of the rationale for this position appears in
Heckler v. Chaney. 326 Declining to review the FDA’s decision not to investigate
the use of pharmaceuticals for lethal injections, the Supreme Court observed
that “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the
statute it is charged with enforcing.” 327 The choice of cases to pursue reflects
the agency’s balancing of factors that typically are not governed by law. 328 Thus,

& Robert Pear, Trump Sided with Mulvaney in Push to Nullify Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/us/politics/trump-aca.html [perma.cc/TQ2E-XXJ4].
323. See Adam Liptak, Texas’ One-Stop Shopping for Judge in Health Care Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/us/politics/texas-judge-obamacare.html
[perma.cc/LTS9-8JP3]. For an excellent analysis of how venue provisions enable plaintiffs to
pick a judge through their choice of where to file, see Alex Botoman, Note, Divisional JudgeShopping, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., Winter 2018, at 297, 315–20.
324. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“[A] single judge in New York enjoined the government from applying [a new regulatory requirement] to anyone, without regard to geography or participation in this or any
other lawsuit.”).
325. See Tami Luhby, New House Rules to Allow Democrats to Defend Obamacare, CNN
(Jan. 3, 2019, 8:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/02/politics/new-house-rules-democratsobamacare-aca/index.html [perma.cc/S95H-F66U].
326. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
327. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823, 831, 837–38.
328. Id. at 831 (“[T]he agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but
whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely
to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s
overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action
at all.”).
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the Court reasoned that when Congress does not legislate enforcement criteria, courts lack standards for judging enforcement decisions. 329 In the language of the APA, those decisions are “committed to agency discretion.” 330
When an agency adopts a nonenforcement policy as part of an effort to
undermine a statutory program, the power to set enforcement policy recognized in Heckler can be an effective tool of sabotage. In practical terms, a statute
that is not enforced may be indistinguishable from one that has been formally
repealed. Yet not every nonenforcement policy is sabotage. In considering
whether nonenforcement crosses the line, close attention must be paid to the
agency’s intentions and the permanence or impermanence of its policy.
The debate over the Obama administration’s immigration enforcement
initiatives illustrates how difficult these judgments can be to make, at least for
individuals who are not directly involved in the agency decisionmaking process. The administration promulgated two enforcement policies, DACA and
DAPA, through memoranda that identified specific types of cases agencies
would decline to prosecute. 331 In contrast to the enforcement policy at issue
in Heckler, the Obama policies were made available to the public in advance
of specific prosecution decisions. They also set out seemingly rule-like criteria
that frontline officers were directed to apply in making enforcement decisions.
Going further still, the policies invited immigrants who lacked lawful status to
apply for “deferred action,” a long-established form of executive relief from
deportation. 332 Under similarly long-standing regulations, successful deferred-action applicants became eligible for a range of benefits—most notably,
temporary authorization to work in the United States. 333
Implicitly equating categorical nonenforcement with administrative sabotage, some commentators argued the publicity and categorical nature of
these policies distinguished them from ordinary exercises of enforcement discretion that Heckler recognizes are within agencies’ authority. 334 Because the
policies effectively set rules governing primary behavior, they amounted to an
attempt to legislate that both intruded on Congress’s legislative power and violated the president’s duty to faithfully execute the law. In a compelling response, Adam Cox and Christina Rodríguez argued that the Constitution and
federal immigration laws implicitly delegate authority to the president to set

329. Id. at 830.
330. 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2).
331. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) and Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programs), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
332. Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law
Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58 (2015).
333. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2021).
334. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 671, 759–61 (2014); Peter Margulies, President Obama’s Immigration Plan: Rewriting the
Law, LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/11/presidentobamas-immigration-plan-rewriting-the-law [perma.cc/T8FU-GNWV].
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broad-scale enforcement priorities. 335 Cox and Rodríguez argued that, rather
than reflecting an impermissible attempt to legislate, the categorical, public
nature of the Obama initiatives served the rule of law by addressing low-level
bureaucrats’ resistance to prior presidential directives, ensuring that like cases
were treated alike, establishing transparent enforcement policies, and exposing the president to political accountability for his oversight of the immigration system. 336 Given these rule-of-law benefits, the administration’s
recognition of the limited legal benefits deferred-action status confers, and the
administration’s willingness to be held politically accountable for its enforcement decisions, Cox and Rodríguez argued that the initiatives were a permissible exercise of enforcement discretion. 337
Cox and Rodríguez have the better of the debate over the Obama immigration initiatives, but it is not difficult to see why critics view the initiatives
as examples of administrative sabotage. If the administration had set out to
undermine the Immigration and Nationality Act (and its lawyers were gaslighting the public when they intoned that only Congress could confer lawful
status on DACA and DAPA recipients), the initiatives would be examples of
sabotage. The Supreme Court’s holding that the recission of DACA was subject to judicial review, which had the effect of entrenching the policy, provides
further support for this view. 338
Much the same can be said about the federal government’s marijuana enforcement policies. Under the federal Controlled Substances Act, marijuana
is a Schedule I drug, which may not be cultivated or distributed except as allowed by federal law. 339 Since 1996, however, thirty-seven states have authorized the use of marijuana for medical purposes and eighteen have
decriminalized the use of marijuana for adults over the age of 21. 340 A large
marijuana industry has developed in these states, subject to “regulation that
ranges from robust to haphazard.” 341
In 2009, the Justice Department published a memorandum signed by
Deputy Attorney General David Ogden that provided guidance to United
States attorneys on enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in states
with medical marijuana laws. The memorandum stated that prosecuting “sig-

335. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015).
336. See id. at 112.
337. See id. at 222–24.
338. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1911–14
(2020).
339. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
340. Jeremy Berke, Shayanne Gal & Yeji Jesse Lee, Marijuana Legalization Is Sweeping the
US. See Every State Where Cannabis Is Legal, INSIDER (July 9, 2021, 9:20 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1 [perma.cc/DU32-583N].
341. Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana
Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 187 (2016) (footnote omitted).
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nificant traffickers of illegal drugs” and “the disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks” were “core” priorities of the department. 342 It then observed that “[a]s a general matter, pursuit of these priorities
should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions
are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing
for the medical use of marijuana.” 343
The Ogden memorandum “was taken by many as a green light to the development of large-scale, commercial marijuana facilities in the states.” 344
When DOJ later waffled on its stance toward prosecuting medical-marijuana
facilities, Congress began to enact appropriations riders that prohibited the
use of funds “to prevent such States from implementing their own State laws
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.” 345 DOJ does not appear to have set out to undermine the Controlled
Substances Act, 346 but it is not difficult to imagine a similar enforcement policy that was motivated by hostility to a statutory regime. Had DOJ set out to
undermine the Act and Congress codified its policy, the Ogden memo would
be a clear-cut example of administrative sabotage.
Other enforcement tools can be used for sabotage. For example, settlement agreements, 347 deferred prosecution agreements, 348 and industry-wide
consent agreements can bind agencies through leadership changes and presidential administrations. 349 In some agencies, enforcement drives rulemaking,
so eliminating enforcement affects the agency’s rulemaking agenda. 350 Still
other enforcement policies give rise to legally protected reliance interests, requiring later administrations to go through lengthy administrative processes
to change enforcement policies. 351

342. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. David W. Ogden to Selected U.S. Att’ys 1
(Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [perma.cc/Q863-MJA8].
343. Id. at 1–2.
344. Kamin, supra note 341, at 189.
345. See, e.g., Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015,
Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217.
346. Ogden, supra note 342, at 2 (noting that “no State can authorize violations of federal
law” and that “the list of factors above is not intended to describe exhaustively when a federal
prosecution may be warranted”).
347. Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of
Executive Branch Discretion, 23 Op. O.L.C. 126, 127 (1999).
348. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 864–69
(2007). As Garrett notes, however, deferred prosecution typically gives the government sole and
unreviewable discretion to determine whether an agreement has been breached. Id.
349. See Deacon, supra note 56, at 813–15.
350. See Confessore, supra note 16 (describing how changes in CFPB supervision and enforcement undermined the Bureau’s rulemaking).
351. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1911–14
(2020) (holding that the Department of Homeland Security was required to consider a forbearance-only policy and to account for reliance interests before rescinding the DACA program).
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For the most part, these tools are not subject to robust checks. As the marijuana example illustrates, Congress can influence enforcement policy
through appropriations and oversight. Heckler’s “presumption of unreviewability” can be overcome when, say, a statute lays down specific criteria for an
agency to follow when considering whether to bring cases. 352 In addition, the
Supreme Court recently reiterated that agency policies that go beyond mere
nonenforcement and create substantive benefits are subject to judicial review. 353 Yet even with these qualifications, many enforcement policies fall outside the scope of review. 354
5.

Contracting and Grantmaking

Section III.B.5 described how the White House can use agency budgets as
a tool of systemic sabotage. Money decisions can also be used to attack statutory programs directly. Consider HHS’s decision to reduce or eliminate funding for ACA “Navigators” under the Trump administration.
Navigators are private-sector groups that help individuals enroll in insurance plans offered through ACA exchanges. 355 In August 2017, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) announced it would reduce funding
for marketplace outreach by at least 90 percent and for enrollment assistance
by about 40 percent. 356 The following year, CMS cut funding for consumer
enrollment assistance and outreach through the Navigator program to $10
million for the thirty-four states whose Affordable Care Act marketplaces are
managed by the federal government. 357 This brought Navigator funding to less
than 20 percent of its 2016 level. 358 In April 2019, CMS finalized a rule that
reclassified Navigators’ consumer-assistance functions as “optional.” 359

352. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834–35 (1985); TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R43708, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW
(2014).
353. See Regents of the Univ. of. Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1911–12.
354. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 133
(1987) (holding that decision to settle an unfair labor practice charge was not subject to judicial
review); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984) (holding that private plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge IRS’s failure to enforce statute that required agency to deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n
on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing
to challenge defendant agencies’ failure to complete privacy impact assessment before collecting
voter data).
355. See generally Robert Vargas, How Health Navigators Legitimize the Affordable Care
Act to the Uninsured Poor, 165 SOC. SCI. & MED. 263 (2016).
356. Sabotage Watch: Tracking Efforts to Undermine the ACA, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.cbpp.org/sabotage-watch-tracking-efforts-to-underminethe-aca [perma.cc/D5GR-C6M2].
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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These funding decisions supported Trump’s stated goal of showing that
the ACA was “failing.” 360 But the cost of litigation and barriers to congressional oversight meant the decisions were effectively final when they were announced. After one group’s funding was cut from $1.2 million to $129,899, its
director told the Washington Post that it would likely shut down. 361
6.

Propaganda and Disinformation

Finally, executive-branch actors can spread falsehoods, lies, and propaganda about programs they administer. An assortment of statements highlighted by the complaint in City of Columbus v. Trump illustrates the White
House’s use of this strategy. Trump claimed that “[t]he Democrats [sic]
ObamaCare is imploding,” that “ObamaCare is a broken mess,” and that
“Obamacare is virtually dead. At best, you could say it’s in its final legs.” 362 His
former chief strategist boasted the administration was undertaking executive
action to “blow [the ACA] up” and “blow those [insurance] exchanges up.”363
Nor is the ACA the only statutory program that executive-branch actors
have targeted with propaganda and disinformation. An EPA scientist stated,
“Since Trump was elected, the palpable sense is just that they don’t like what
we do.” 364 During the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump and White House officials disparaged the Centers for Disease Control and reportedly altered agency
reports and guidance to conform with the president’s conspiratorial views on
the pandemic. 365
Propaganda and disinformation can undermine statutory programs
through a number of mechanisms. Most immediately, officials’ statements can
lead to a program’s failure to accomplish its policy goals—the apparent objective of Trump’s statements concerning ACA exchanges. They can sap agency
morale, leading to a hollowing out of the agency’s staff and expertise. And they
can diminish an agency’s reputation, increasing the odds that Congress or the
courts will dismantle a program.

360. See Trump on North Korea: ‘Nobody’s Safe,’ FOX NEWS (May 24, 2017),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-on-north-korea-nobodys-safe [perma.cc/B4LL-8ZL2].
361. Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, HHS Slashes Funding to Groups Helping ACA Consumers Enroll by Up to 92 Percent, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/national/health-science/hhs-slashes-funding-to-some-aca-navigator-groups-by-more-than-60percent/2017/09/14/729c394c-9957-11e7-b569-3360011663b4_story.html [perma.cc/Y3T5-TERC].
362. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 25–26, City of Columbus v. Trump,
453 F. Supp. 3d 770 (D. Md. 2020) (No. 18-cv-2364).
363. Id. at 25.
364. Freeman & Jacobs, supra note 25, at 618 (quoting Rachel M. Cohen, “I Fully Intend to
Outlast These People”: 18 Federal Workers on What It’s Really Like to Work for the Trump Administration, WASHINGTONIAN (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonian.com/2019/04/07/18-federalworkers-what-its-really-like-to-work-for-the-trump-administration [perma.cc/JZD6-6NFW]).
365. See Dan Diamond, Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19,
POLITICO (Sept. 12, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusivetrump-officials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809 [perma.cc/ZM3L-ANGW].
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Of all the tools of sabotage, propaganda and disinformation are the most
difficult for Congress and the courts to check. No law regulates high-level officials’ speech, and any effort to do so would face insurmountable First
Amendment and separation of powers hurdles. Nor is counter-speech likely
to be an effective response to executive branch propaganda and misinformation. Agencies such as the FDA and CDC have a well-deserved reputation
for scientific expertise that saboteurs can exploit. And the president is covered
obsessively by the press. This gives presidents the advantage in battles to shape
popular opinion, 366 which they are free to use for sabotage.
*

*

*

Other tools of systemic and programmatic sabotage are doubtless available to presidents and their agency heads. But the tools collected in this survey
illustrate the basic points: Congress’s delegation of statutory authority gives
agencies an array of tools for attacking statutory programs. While agencies are
subject to an array of political and legal checks, there is no guarantee that Congress or the courts will check particular instances of sabotage. Some tools of
sabotage are virtually immune from external checks. Others will be checked
only under contingent political conditions.
These findings, together with Part II’s account of administrative sabotage’s origins, shed light on the unusual amount of sabotage that occurred
during the Trump administration. It is tempting to see the Trump-era sabotage as an extension of Trump himself—the natural product of entrusting the
federal government to an unaccomplished manager whose populist political
brand centered contempt for inherited laws, institutions, and norms. But
while presidents vary in their ethics, fealty to law, and commitment to inherited statutory programs, the president’s personal characteristics are not central to the account of sabotage offered here. Sabotage is the product of
entrenched political and legal dynamics that operate independently of any
particular president. Accordingly, the experience of sabotage in the Trump
administration is more likely a harbinger of things to come than a historical
aberration limited to his presidency.
IV. LEGAL RESPONSES
The primary goals of this Article are to highlight the phenomenon of administrative sabotage and develop a theory of its causes and mechanisms. As
the prior Parts argued, administrative sabotage reflects a distinct mode of
agency action, which emerges from presidents’ incentives to retrench statutory programs in an environment where formal retrenchment imposes high
political costs. For an administration motivated to engage in sabotage, the
contemporary administrative state provides a cornucopia of tools.

366. See Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 71, 80 (2017).
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We have already seen the challenge that sabotage poses to Niskanen’s
“budget maximizing” theory of the bureaucracy. That theory views the institutions of the federal government as vehicles for advancing the preferences of
agency heads and employees. It does not account for presidents’ incentives to
undermine statutory programs. Nor does it consider the tools of sabotage
available to presidents and their appointees. This leads the theory to predictions that are at odds with the reality of the contemporary administrative state.
Other well-known theories of the bureaucracy similarly fail to account for
the dynamics of sabotage. For example, James Q. Wilson seeks to explain the
supposed inefficiency of government agencies compared to their private-sector counterparts. 367 Wilson argues that government agencies are subject to
constraints that do not apply to private firms. 368 This leads agencies to emphasize process and equity over effective task performance. 369 Like Niskanen, Wilson does not grapple with agency heads’ ideological incentives to attack the
programs they administer or the incentives created by the difficulty of formally amending statutory programs. Even formal theorists of the bureaucracy
who recognize the risk of sabotage potentially underestimate it. Sean Gailmard,
for example, develops a formal model of delegation in which an agency faces
increasing exogenous costs for stepping outside a policy window defined by
the legislature. 370 That assumption does not hold when members of the president’s party support sabotage and control the levers of power in Congress.
This Article does not aim to develop a theory of the bureaucracy, so I take
no position on how sabotage should be integrated into those theories. However, it seems clear that action to dismantle or disable statutory regimes is an
important part of what federal administrative agencies now do. As such, theorists should incorporate it into their models of the administrative state.
Beyond these theoretical implications, sabotage raises more immediate practical concerns—most importantly, how the law might prevent and constrain it.
Responses to sabotage might come from a variety of actors and institutions: Congress, agency officials, courts, the media, interest groups, and more. 371 Similarly,
367. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT (1989).
368. See id. at 115, 315–16.
369. See id. at 132.
370. See Gailmard, supra note 45.
371. On the prospects for bureaucratic resistance, see, for example, ROSEMARY O’LEARY,
THE ETHICS OF DISSENT: MANAGING GUERRILLA GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 2019); Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr., Matthew R. Miles & Chad B. Newswander, Why Public Employees Rebel: Guerrilla
Government in the Public Sector, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 64 (2020); Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant
Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 (2019); and Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653 (2018). On the role of the media and open-government laws, see,
for example, SELLERS ET AL., supra note 29; David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the
Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2017); and JONATHAN LASH, KATHERINE
GILLMAN & DAVID SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE STORY OF THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1984). On the role of organizational culture and professional standards, see BREHM & GATES, supra note 42, and WILLIAM G. RESH,
RETHINKING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (2015).
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responses might take many different forms, from changes to agencies’ authorizing legislation to actions by low-level agency officials and outside monitors.
As this Article focuses on the law of administrative sabotage, I focus in
this Part on the legislation governing agencies and to a lesser extent the law of
judicial review. In the federal system, this body of law is a mix of trans-substantive legislation such as the APA, program-specific legislation, and judicial
precedent. I contend that while law should address the risk of administrative
sabotage, this is better done through changes to the design of particular statutory programs than through cross-cutting reforms.
Section IV.A explains the case against cross-cutting reforms: although
those reforms would make it more difficult for agencies to attack statutory
programs, they would also interfere with legitimate efforts to implement statutory policy. On balance, their costs to legitimate policy implementation exceed their benefits in checking sabotage. Section IV.B develops the case for
program-specific reforms.
A. Against Cross-Cutting Reforms
Federal administrative agencies are governed by overlapping bodies of
law. Congress defines agencies’ authorities and mandates in agency-specific
legislation and may require agencies to follow specific procedures. Many of
the requirements governing agencies, however, are defined through government-wide legislation such as the APA, which sets out requirements for “each
authority of the Government of the United States.” 372 Finally, courts have
elaborated a complex body of precedent interpreting both bodies of legislation
that some scholars consider an “administrative common law.” 373
A basic question about legal responses to administrative sabotage is where
they should be located within this framework: Is sabotage better addressed
through cross-cutting reforms or changes to the design of specific agencies
and programs?
Building on the observation that administrative law is biased in favor of
protecting negative liberty, cross-cutting reforms would subject agencies to
new procedures and forms of judicial review that encourage faithful implementation of statutory mandates. For instance, Congress might amend the
APA (or the courts might reinterpret it) to impose stricter procedural controls
on executive orders, agency budget decisions, and internal agency reorganizations. 374 Congress or the courts might expand the scope of judicial review over

372. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
373. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (2012). In addition to these sources of external law, Professors Metzger and Stack suggest that agencies are governed by “internal administrative law.” See Metzger
& Stack, supra note 257, at 1250.
374. See, e.g., Shalev Roisman, Presidential Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1320–22 (2021)
(proposing that courts require the president to establish that she deliberated before exercising
statutory powers); Kovacs, supra note 240, at 98–112 (proposing to subject the Executive Office
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enforcement policies and contracting and grantmaking decisions. 375 They
might recognize new mechanisms to force agencies to act when they fail to
implement statutory policy. 376 And reforms might modify standards of judicial review to clarify that administrative sabotage is an abuse of discretion that
violates APA § 706. 377
These reforms, however, would limit agencies’ ability to engage not only
in sabotage but also in good-faith policy implementation. Suppose Congress
required agencies to follow notice-and-comment procedures before making a
material change to their enforcement priorities and made the agencies’ response
to comments reviewable under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. These
changes would impede the use of enforcement policy as a tool of sabotage. But
they would also frustrate good-faith attempts to refocus enforcement to reflect
changed circumstances or the views of a new presidential administration. 378
New action-forcing mechanisms are an especially dangerous response to
sabotage. For one thing, proposals to expose inaction to judicial review are in tension with the Supreme Court’s understanding of Article III. 379 More importantly,
the tools could be used by a hostile administration to carry out sabotage.
Suppose, for example, that courts required agencies “to supply explanations for particular nonenforcement decisions” and “require[d] agencies to

of the President to the procedural requirements and forms of judicial review that govern other
forms of agency action).
375. E.g., Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement
Discretion: The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911, 1915 (2016) (arguing that
challenges to the exercise of nonenforcement discretion be evaluated as ordinary administrative
law problems); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1686 (2004) (arguing that courts generally should reject prohibitions on judicial review of agency inaction in favor of requiring agencies to give reasons
explaining their decisions and supplying standards disciplining their discretion).
376. E.g., Bressman, supra note 375, at 1693; Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays:
How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency
Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1434–35 (2011).
377. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ reluctance to hold
that sabotage is an abuse of discretion under the APA).
378. Thus, the reasons for resisting cross-cutting administrative law reforms parallel the
reasons for resisting what Professor Nicholas Bagley terms “the procedure fetish.” See Nicholas
Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2019) (cleaned up). While acknowledging
that agency procedure has a role to play in preserving the legitimacy of administrative action
and countering agency capture, he contends that strict procedures can exacerbate the very problems they aim to solve: “New procedures should be greeted with suspicion; old procedures should
be revisited, with an eye to cutting them back or eliminating them altogether.” Id. at 400–01.
379. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court described the argument that the violation
of a statutory procedure gives interested persons an injury that can be redressed by the courts as
“remarkable.” 504 U.S. 555, 572–74 (1992). In another leading precedent, the Court stated that
plaintiffs seeking “programmatic improvements” in the administration of statutory programs
belonged in “the offices of the [agency] or the halls of Congress.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness
All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)).
Against this backdrop, expanding the scope of judicial review to include more forms of agency
inaction would inevitably provoke Article III objections.
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promulgate standards governing all such decisions.” 380 Following a switch
from an antiregulatory to a proregulatory administration, an agency seeking
to adopt new enforcement policies would have to develop an administrative
record that explained the changes to the satisfaction of reviewing courts. An
ostensibly action-forcing mechanism could thus be used to lock in an enforcement policy that undermined enforcement of a statute.
One might respond that the burden of justifying changes in enforcement
policy is minimal and that courts are unlikely to resist changes that redirect
enforcement policies for legitimate purposes. But neither response is compelling. Many observers believe that “reasoned decisionmaking” requirements
that courts have imposed on agencies have contributed to the “ossification” of
agency regulations. 381 And as explained above, courts will often be willing participants in administrative sabotage. 382
B. Anticipating Sabotage in Statutory Design
If addressing sabotage through cross-cutting reforms is misguided, what
is the alternative? In this Section, I argue that sabotage is better addressed
through changes to the design of specific programs and agencies and, more
broadly, that sabotage requires rethinking conventional wisdom about the design of federal statutory programs.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this Section’s focus on statutory design. The choices described here are largely resolved through legislation. In arguing that administrative sabotage should be
addressed through program-specific legislation, I assume that Congress is capable of revisiting agencies’ authorizing legislation. I do not address the feasibility of amending specific agencies’ authorizing legislation within a particular
time frame and recognize the complex political economy of that project. 383
380. Bressman, supra note 375, at 1693.
381. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493–94 (2012).
382. For an example of how this is likely to play out, consider the Biden administration’s
efforts to temporarily halt deportations at the beginning of the new presidential administration.
On January 20, 2021, the acting secretary of homeland security issued a memorandum that ordered a comprehensive review of enforcement policies and directed “an immediate pause on
removals of any noncitizen with a final order of removal [with certain exception] for 100 days”
while the review was conducted. Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to Troy Miller, Senior Off., U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Tae Johnson, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t & Tracey Renaud, Senior Off., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs. (Jan. 20, 2021) (footnote omitted), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0120_enforcement-memo_signed.pdf [perma.cc/F9EH-RLHR]. In response to a suit
filed by Texas attorney general Ken Paxton, a district judge appointed by President Trump entered a preliminary injunction barring implementation of the hundred-day pause, reasoning that
the freeze would injure Texas’s pecuniary interests. Texas v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 3d 598,
619–21 (S.D. Tex. 2021).
383. That said, recent scholarship shows that Congress continues to make a substantial
amount of statutory policy, although it is packaged into fewer laws. See JAMES M. CURRY &
FRANCES E. LEE, THE LIMITS OF PARTY: CONGRESS AND LAWMAKING IN A POLARIZED ERA
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The contribution is not to suggest that any particular reform is feasible in the
short term but to highlight the importance of addressing sabotage when Congress does act.
In simplest form, the argument is that statutory programs should be designed for sabotage. That is, when designing statutory programs, policymakers
should not assume that programs will be administered in good faith by officials who are committed to a program’s objectives. To some extent, this is old
news: many choices about institutional and statutory design, agency procedure, and judicial review are already shaped by the recognition that agencies
are imperfect agents for enforcing and elaborating statutory policy. Yet the
risk of sabotage is largely missing from debates over the design of particular
programs. In a seventeen-volume legislative history of the ACA, I found a single reference to “sabotage.” 384 In a fifteen-volume legislative history of the
Dodd-Frank Act, I found none. 385
Given the complexity of statutory and agency design, I cannot address all
the ways that legislation might be designed to resist sabotage. Instead, I consider sabotage’s implications for three questions that are the subject of longrunning debates in public law scholarship: the legal position of agency heads,
the scope of statutory delegations to agencies, and the choice to divide or concentrate authority to implement a statutory scheme. In each area, the risk of
sabotage complicates long-standing debates; at times, it reorients conventional wisdom.
1.

Constraining the Appointment of Agency Saboteurs

Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Myers v. United States 386 and
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 387 forests have been felled debating statutory provisions that specify a fixed term in office for agency heads and limit
the grounds on which they may be removed. 388

(2020); Sean Farhang, Legislative Capacity and Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization, DAEDALUS, Summer 2021, at 49.
384. See Health Care Reform in the 21st Century: A Conversation with Health and Human
Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th
Cong. 65 (2009), reprinted in HEALTH CARE REFORM: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, PUBLIC LAW NO. 111-148 (2010) (Bernard D. Reams,
Jr. & Michael P. Forrest eds., Supp. VIII 2011), HeinOnline.
385. See 1–15 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (William H. Manz ed., 2010), HeinOnline.
386. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
387. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
388. At the Supreme Court level, major post–Humphrey’s Executor cases include Seila Law
LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); and Wiener v. United States,
357 U.S. 349 (1958). Compare Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1072 (2006) (suggesting that majorities in the First Congress believed the
Constitution’s grant of executive power enabled the president to remove executive officers at
will), and Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive
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Debates over statutory removal protections are premised on the assumption—prominently articulated in Humphrey’s Executor—that protecting agency
heads from being removed by the president encourages faithful policy execution by giving them independence to act in the public interest. 389 But as the same
passage in Humphrey’s Executor recognizes, this “independence” does not extend to the president’s selection of agency heads. 390 When a president installs
an agency head opposed to a program she administers, removal protections
do not ensure faithful policy implementation but protect agency saboteurs.
These dynamics highlight the shortsightedness of focusing on ex post removal protections to the exclusion of checks that ensure agency heads are capable and well-motivated in the first place. People concerned with the faithful
implementation of statutory mandates should focus more on ex ante qualifications for agency heads and less on the protection that appointees enjoy once
in office. 391
This suggestion invites an objection that limiting the selection of agency
heads infringes the president’s authority under the Appointments Clause to
“nominate” and “appoint” officers of the United States. 392 But there is a rich
history supporting the constitutionality of ex ante appointment qualifications,
beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789. 393 There, Congress specified that the
attorney general and United States attorneys were to be “learned in the law,”
substantially limiting the president’s choice of appointees. 394
Ironically, a leading precedent supporting the constitutionality of statutory appointment qualifications is Myers—the high-point of the Court’s unitary-executive jurisprudence. Dissenting from the Court’s holding that the
president had inherent authority to fire first-class postmasters, Justice
During the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) (arguing that
from 1789 to 1889, presidents asserted power to remove subordinate executive officials for any
reason), with PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41–42 (2009) (reviewing constitutional arguments and historical practice and concluding that the removal power posted by unitary-executive proponents does not
exist), and Daniel D. Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive, 73 STAN. L.
REV. 175 (2021) (contending that the unitary-executive theory of the president’s removal power
fails to account for the British Crown’s lack of a similar power).
389. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 625–26 (reasoning that the Federal Trade Commission Act sought “to create a body of experts . . . independent of executive authority, except in its
selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or
any department of the government”).
390. Id.
391. For a similar proposal concerning acting officials, see Nina A. Mendelson, The Permissibility of Acting Officials: May the President Work Around Senate Confirmation?, 72 ADMIN.
L. REV. 533, 605 (2020).
392. See Common Legis. Encroachments on Exec. Branch Auth., 13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 250
(1989) (claiming that such restrictions intrude into the functions and responsibilities assigned
by the Constitution to the executive branch).
393. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 503, 541).
394. Id.; see HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33886, STATUTORY
QUALIFICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITIONS 2–3 (2015).
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Brandeis protested that “since the foundation of the Government,” Congress
had enacted “a multitude of laws” that “limit the President’s power to make
nominations.” 395 Brandeis then compiled ten pages of statutory citations detailing such restrictions. 396
The Myers majority disagreed with Brandeis over the president’s power
to remove executive officers, 397 but it did not dispute Congress’s authority to
impose appointment qualifications. To the contrary, Chief Justice Taft disavowed the suggestion that “denial of the legislative power to regulate removals
in some way” entailed “the denial of power to prescribe qualifications for office, or reasonable classification for promotion.” 398 As David Lewis has documented, Congress has since enacted hundreds of ex ante appointment
qualifications. 399 While a Reagan administration lawyer active in the movement to revivify the unitary-executive theory asserted that these qualifications
infringe the Appointments Clause, 400 the history is squarely to the contrary.
In light of this history, the case against the constitutionality of appointment
qualifications is unimpressive. 401
The more important practical question is how appointment qualifications
should be enforced if Congress uses them. Such qualifications were traditionally enforced by the Senate, leaving them vulnerable to nullification by the
president’s co-partisans. 402 But more powerful enforcement mechanisms are
possible.
Following the model of the APA and the Federal Register Act, legislation
could provide that agency action has no legal effect unless authorized by an
official who meets statutory appointment qualifications. 403 In recent years, the

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 265–74.
Id. at 176 (majority opinion).
Id. at 128 (emphases added).
See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL
INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946–1997, at 50 (2003).
400. See Common Legis. Encroachments on Exec. Branch Auth., 13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 248
(1989) (William P. Barr).
401. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (“[L]ongstanding practice ‘ “is a consideration of great weight’ ” in cases concerning ‘the allocation of power between
[the] two elected branches of Government[]’. . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting NLRB
v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014))). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
402. See HOGUE, supra note 394, at 2–3; see also supra note 198 and accompanying text
(noting the 115th Congress’s confirmation of an agency head who openly opposed the mission
of the agency he led).
403. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (“Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely
notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.”); 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (“A document required . . . to be published in the Federal Register is
not valid as against a person who has not had actual knowledge of it until the duplicate originals
or certified copies of the document have been filed with the Office of the Federal Register and a
copy made available for public inspection . . . .”).
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Supreme Court has recognized common law causes of action and remedies for
parties affected by the actions of an “unconstitutionally structured” agency. 404
Litigants might invoke those precedents to challenge action by appointees
who do not satisfy statutory appointment criteria. In addition, Congress has
prohibited expenditures of federal funds to pay salaries of officials who do not
satisfy statutory appointment qualifications—a particularly strong enforcement mechanism given that spending federal funds in the absence of an appropriation is a felony. 405
Each of these enforcement mechanisms raises litigable issues. The key
point is that focusing exclusively on removal protections overlooks other tools
Congress could use to ensure that agency heads are motivated to administer
statutory programs in good faith. In a sense, removal protections are irrelevant unless Congress does more to ensure qualified people are appointed in
the first instance.
2.

Limiting Statutory Delegations

Another choice affected by the risk of administrative sabotage involves
the scope of statutory delegations to agencies. Since the New Deal, conventional wisdom has held that Congress’s limited capacity makes broad statutory
delegations to agencies practically inevitable. 406 Going further, many scholars
defend delegation as normatively desirable on a variety of grounds. 407
Perhaps it is. But broad delegations also increase the risk of administrative
sabotage. First, statutory delegations create the basic authorities that agencies
use for sabotage. Second, broad delegations create ambiguity about the scope
of agency authority, allowing agencies to present actions designed to kill or
nullify statutory programs as ordinary exercises of agency discretion. 408 Third,
that ambiguity makes it less likely that administrative sabotage will be checked
404. See Zaring, supra note 218, at 728–34.
405. Cf. Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and Atomic
Energy Commission Appropriation Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-144, § 502, 83 Stat. 323, 336–37
(barring the use of appropriated funds to pay compensation to persons lacking specified immigration status); 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (authorizing criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations of federal antideficiency laws).
406. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 14 (1941) (observing that the “total time” available to Congress
means that “[t]ime spent on details must be at the sacrifice of time spent on matters of broad
public policy”).
407. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY (2018); Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7, 88 (2017) (“[D]elegation is
‘the dynamo of modern government.’ ” (quoting LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 33 (1965)).
408. See, e.g., Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 97 (D.C. Cir.) (noting the government’s argument that Medicaid work requirements advanced the purposes of Medicaid by “improving
health outcomes; . . . address[ing] behavioral and social factors that influence health outcomes;
and . . . incentiviz[ing] beneficiaries to engage in their own health care and achieve better health
outcomes”), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 890 (2020).
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by judicial and congressional oversight, because an agency can claim that its
actions are within the scope of its statutory authority and entitled to judicial
deference.
The risk that broad delegations will be used for sabotage does not mean
lawmakers should never delegate broadly. In their leading account, David Epstein and Sharon O’Halloran show that Congress’s choice to delegate is usefully analyzed from the perspective of transaction-cost economics. 409 Just as a
firm considering whether to produce a component in-house or to outsource
production will evaluate the transaction costs of both strategies, lawmakers
compare the costs of legislating with those of delegating statutory authority to
an agency. Neither strategy is costless. The choice depends on which offers the
greatest net benefits. 410
Viewed within this framework, the risk of administrative sabotage shows
that the costs of delegation are higher than commonly assumed. Epstein and
O’Halloran, for example, focus on the risks of agency slack and drift. 411 The
risk that agencies will affirmatively attack the programs they administer does
not figure prominently in their account of Congress’s delegation decisions. All
else being equal, the possibility that an agency such as the CFPB will attack
statutes and programs that it administers implies that Congress should delegate
less. In doing so, Congress reduces agencies’ freedom of action, reduces ambiguity about the scope of lawful agency action, and increases the likelihood that
sabotage will be checked through judicial review and congressional oversight.
The risk of administrative sabotage thus points to a progressive case for
limiting the scope of statutory delegations—a position generally associated
with conservative efforts to undermine the administrative state. 412 The rationale is not that congressional delegation abdicates legislative power, obscures responsibility for policy decisions, or sets up unaccountable agencies.
It is that delegation contains the seeds for undoing the very policies Congress
wishes to advance.
3.

Fragmenting Policy Implementation

A third question raised by the risk of sabotage involves the choice to concentrate or divide authority to implement statutory programs. In the classic
New Deal model of federal legislation, statutory policies were implemented by
a single agency whose actions were subject to judicial review. 413 In the decades
409. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 23, at 34–35.
410. See id. at 49 (“When legislators feel that delegation will increase their electoral opportunities relative to policy making in Congress, then the executive will be given discretionary authority. When legislators perceive greater advantage in making policy themselves, despite the
investment of their own scarce time and resources that this involves, they will write specific legislation that leaves the executive with little latitude.”).
411. See id. at 47–48.
412. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
413. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1247–54 (1986).

March 2022]

Administrative Sabotage

821

since, however, Congress has increasingly divided implementation authority—
both among federal agencies and between federal, state, local, and tribal governments. 414 As a 2006 article observes, “[S]tatutes that parcel out authority or jurisdiction to multiple agencies may be the norm, rather than an exception.” 415
As a matter of formal theory, dividing implementation authority can lead
either to underimplementation or to a “race to the top,” in which agencies
competing for resources, attention, or prestige compete to out-regulate one
another. 416 Still, commentators tend to view statutes that divide implementation authority as the ugly stepsister of statutes that are implemented by a dedicated federal agency. 417
This skepticism stems in part from the fact that proponents of federal
health and welfare programs have historically used state implementation to
defuse opposition to the expansion of those programs. 418 In large part, however, the skepticism reflects the fact that compared to a world in which policy
is zealously administered by a single federal agency, dividing implementation
authority creates new opportunities for ideologically motivated actors to contest federal policy. 419 As Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken argue,
nominally “cooperative” structures institutionalize state opposition, giving
state implementers vehicles to “resist, challenge, and even dissent from federal
policy.” 420
The literature on uncooperative federalism focuses on state opposition to
programs that federal agencies support, but this configuration can be reversed. When federal agencies attack statutory programs, state implementation can be a counterweight to federal sabotage. Two recent case studies
414. See, e.g., Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1961, 1978
(2019); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1375 (2017); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134, 1155 (2012); Tribal Self-Governance Program, INDIAN HEALTH SERV.,
https://www.ihs.gov/selfgovernance/aboutus [perma.cc/838E-NY3D].
415. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 208.
416. See id. at 214; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 414, at 1150.
417. See, e.g., David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and
the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 545 (2008); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids
of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1196 (1977). But cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1253 (1992) (arguing that interstate competition in environmental
regulation is “presumptively beneficial”).
418. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE
OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 177–81 (rev. ed. 2013) (describing Democratic lawmakers’ decision to pursue a strategy of “minimally invasive reform” in the lead-up to the ACA); SHANNA
ROSE, FINANCING MEDICAID: FEDERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE
SAFETY NET 46–50 (2013) (describing Medicaid’s origins in an uncontroversial federal-state program).
419. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
420. Id. at 1307.
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highlight these dynamics. In a sweeping study of the ACA’s first decade, Abbe
Gluck and Thomas Scott-Railton show that the ACA’s reliance on state implementation helped the statute withstand the Trump administration’s assaults. 421 State implementation created instability in the ACA’s early years, but
it put states in constant negotiation with HHS and created a need for hundreds
of state laws and regulations to implement the ACA’s reforms. 422 Although
states remain sites of resistance and opposition to the ACA, thirty-eight states
and the District of Columbia have elected to participate in the Medicaid expansion at the time of writing. 423 The investments necessary to expand Medicaid and the political settlements they reflect have made undermining the
ACA more difficult, whether through formal legislation, executive action, or
litigation.
Similar dynamics have helped the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) withstand administrative sabotage. As Andrew Hammond
recounts, the Trump administration attempted to undermine SNAP through
both legislative and administrative action. 424 In the lead-up to the passage of
the 2018 farm bill—an $860 billion piece of legislation that determines SNAP
funding and eligibility—the House attempted to limit the time that childless,
able-bodied adults who do not meet a work requirement can receive SNAP
benefits. 425 These restrictions would have excluded some 1.2 million people
from SNAP but failed in the face of a threatened Senate filibuster. 426 The same
day that Trump signed the 2018 farm bill, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue proposed a regulation that imposed the same access restrictions the House
wanted. 427 States swiftly challenged the rule in court. 428 Before it took effect, a
district court enjoined the rule on the ground that the USDA violated the APA
in promulgating it. 429 An appeal threat was mooted by an April 2020 stimulus
bill that lifted all SNAP work requirements until a month after the end of the
COVID-19 public health emergency. 430
Hammond argues that SNAP’s federalist structure, combined with “new
property” rights that allow states and nongovernmental organizations to challenge administrative changes to benefits and eligibility, played a central role

421. See Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 25, at 552.
422. Id. at 573.
423. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaidunder-the-affordable-care-act [perma.cc/WW24-VX8C].
424. Andrew Hammond, Litigating Welfare Rights: Medicaid, SNAP, and the Legacy of the
New Property, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 364–65 (2020).
425. Id. at 403.
426. See id. at 403–04.
427. Id. at 404.
428. Id. at 419.
429. Id. at 421.
430. Id.
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in the failure of the proposed benefit cuts. 431 SNAP benefits are funded entirely
by the federal government, but the costs of administering the program are split
between the federal government and the states. 432 This gives rise to “an unholy, but not unstable alliance of state government, federal courts, and public
interest lawyers.” 433 SNAP’s ideological opponents work across federal and
state lines—and across Congress and the administrative state—to impose new
eligibility requirements and cut benefits. Yet when states acting in concert
with federal agencies erect new procedural requirements, the “unholy alliance” ensures that the lawfulness of the requirements will be vigorously challenged.
Gluck, Scott-Railton, and Hammond focus on the antisabotage effects of
dividing implementation authority between the federal government and the
states, but similar dynamics can check sabotage when implementation authority is divided across federal agencies. Sharon Jacobs, for example, traces the
division of authority between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977. 434 Enacted in the aftermath of Watergate and the 1973
oil crisis, the Act divides authority over electricity rates between DOE and
FERC in an effort to limit presidential influence over energy policy. 435 As Jacobs explains, this structure checked the Trump administration’s efforts to
prop up the ailing coal industry. 436
As with delegation, the point is not that dividing implementation is a
cure-all for administrative sabotage. That the ACA and SNAP withstood administrative sabotage was not preordained, and one can imagine how the programs would have fared worse under slightly different conditions. Gluck,
Scott-Railton, and Hammond all caution that institutional design must pay
careful attention to the specific factors and historical developments that led to
those programs’ ability to withstand attacks. Nonetheless, if advocates of federal entitlements have traditionally resisted programs that disperse implementation authority among agencies and governments, the risk of
administrative sabotage is a reason to revisit that choice. 437

431. See id. at 426.
432. Id. at 427.
433. Id.
434. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers,
129 YALE L.J. 378 (2019).
435. See Jacobs, supra note 434, at 411. For example, DOE may “propose rules, regulations,
and statements of policy of general applicability with respect to any function” within FERC’s
jurisdiction, 42 U.S.C. § 7173(a). But apart from acting on the proposal “in an expeditious manner in accordance with such reasonable time limits as may be set by the Secretary,” the decision
to adopt, reject, or delay action on DOE proposals is left to FERC. Id. § 7173(b).
436. Jacobs, supra note 434, at 418 (describing FERC’s rejection of DOE’s fuel-secure energy pricing rule).
437. There is a long history of dividing authority to enforce and administer the laws within
the executive branch, which dates to the earliest legislation enacted under the Constitution. That
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that delegating authority to agencies does not only
create risks that they will exceed their statutory authority, shirk, or depart
from Congress’s policy preferences. It also creates a risk that agencies will attempt to kill or nullify the very programs they administer.
For students of the administrative state, understanding the causes and
mechanisms of administrative sabotage is important because sabotage is an
increasingly important part of what agencies do. To understand “what government agencies do and why they do it,” 438 scholars must account for the
phenomenon of sabotage and the unique legal, institutional, and normative
questions it raises.
For courts, the payoffs from understanding sabotage are less immediate.
Because of courts’ reluctance to examine the subjective reasons for agency action, whether specific agency actions constitute sabotage will often be unclear
in the context of specific cases. Still, courts should be sensitive to the dynamics
of administrative sabotage and willing to use the tools that are available to
them to address it. They should also recognize when invitations to deploy constitutional doctrines are part of an effort to sabotage a statutory regime and
think twice about participating in the project.
For policymakers involved in the design of statutory programs, however,
the payoffs from understanding sabotage are enormous. Particularly since the
public interest era of the late 1960s, the design of federal statutory programs
has been sensitive to the agency costs created by Congress’s reliance on agencies to elaborate and enforce statutory policy. Thus, it is common for Congress
to legislate reporting requirements, consultation requirements, private rights
of action, deadlines, and other checks on faithless execution of the law when
it enacts or revises a program. Yet despite all of these checks, statutory programs continue to be premised on the assumption that they will be implemented in good faith by agencies who are committed to advancing the
program’s policy objectives.
This Article’s overarching contribution is to highlight the dangers of that
assumption. Law can no more eliminate the risk of agency sabotage than it
can eliminate the risk that agencies will act beyond their statutory authority.
But if Congress is to continue relying on agencies, lawmakers must be sensitive to the risk that agencies will attack the very programs they administer.

history would seem to foreclose most constitutional objections to fragmenting implementation
authority as a means of checking administrative sabotage. See Blake Emerson, The Departmental
Structure of Executive Power: Subordinate Checks from Madison to Mueller, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL.
90, 119–24 (2021).
438. WILSON, supra note 367 (cleaned up).

